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ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court has been whittling away at the Fourth
Amendment for decades. The Court's 2014 ruling in Heien v. North
Carolina allowing the police to make a traffic stop based on a reasonable
mistake of law generated little controversy among the Justices and escaped
largely unnoticed by the press-perhaps because yet another Supreme
Court decision reading the Fourth Amendment narrowly is not especially
noteworthy or because the opinion's cursory and overly simplistic analysis
equating law enforcement's reasonablemistakes offact and law minimized
the significance of the Court's decision. But the temptation to dismiss
Heien as just another small chink in the Fourth Amendment's armor ought
to be resisted The Court's ruling substantially expands police officers'
already broad discretion to make traffic stops, includingpretextual ones, to
now include circumstanceswhere no violation of law even occurred
Drawing on both criminal procedurejurisprudence and the criminal
law literaturediscussing mistake of law, this Article begins with a critique
of the Court's reasoningin Heien. The Article then addresses the potential
reach of the Court's ruling. Examining the lower courts' application of
Heien in the eighteen months after it was decided, the Article points out
that the decision can be read broadly to forgive a wide variety of
"reasonable" police mistakes of law. Even more problematic, the
cumulative impact of Heien and some of the Supreme Court's other recent
Fourth Amendment opinions couldpotentially lead courts to tolerate even
unreasonable mistakes law enforcement officials make in interpreting the
law. The Article concludes that, if the Fourth Amendment is construed to
allow any mistakes of law, it should borrowfrom criminal law and ignore
police officers' legal errors only when they relied on an official
interpretationof the law made by an independent, authoritative thirdparty.
Affording the police broader leeway to act based on their own
misunderstandingsof law is unjustifiable and threatens to further fuel the
growing tensions between law enforcement and communities of color.
INTRODUCTION
In its 2014 decision in Heien v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court
concluded that a police officer's reasonable misinterpretation of state
criminal law-in that case, the belief that a vehicle was required to have
two functioning brake lights-does not undermine the reasonable suspicion
required to conduct a traffic stop.1 The eight Justices in the majority, in an
opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts, found reasonable mistakes of law
1.

Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 534 (2014).
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"no less compatible with the concept of reasonable suspicion" than
comparable mistakes of fact.2
Rarely in recent years has a Fourth Amendment ruling from the
Supreme Court rebuffed the great weight of lower court case law by such a
one-sided margin. Although Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Ginsburg,
wrote a concurring opinion in Heien to "elaborate briefly on [the] important
limitations" in the Court's ruling, Justice Sotomayor was the lone
dissenter.4 Unlike her colleagues, Justice Sotomayor did see a distinction
between mistakes of law and fact. She took the position that the
reasonableness of a search or seizure "requires evaluating an officer's
understanding of the facts against the actual state of the law."'
Not only did Heien create little controversy among the Justices
themselves, it also largely escaped the attention of the popular press.6
Perhaps this is unsurprising; after all, the Fourth Amendment has been
under siege for years. Instead of viewing the exclusionary rule as "an
essential part of the right to privacy" and the Fourth Amendment's "most
important constitutional privilege," 7 recent Supreme Court opinions have
disparaged it as a "last resort"8 and a "bitter pill" that "exacts a heavy
toll." 9 And the Justices' attack on the Fourth Amendment has not been
merely rhetorical. According to the Court, the Fourth Amendment does not
flinch when the police make a pretextual traffic stop (in violation of their
own departmental regulations)o and then-no matter how insignificant the
offense -conduct a full custodial arrest" (even if forbidden by state law), 12

2. Id at 536.
3. For citations to representative lower court opinions discussing the issue addressed in Heien,
see id. at 544 n.1 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). By comparison, the holding in Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27 (2001), that using a thermal imager on a home constituted a Fourth Amendment search
conflicted with the "overwhelming majority" of lower court decisions, but the Court split five to four in
that case. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

§ 2.2(e),

at 653 (5th ed. 2012). Although the Justices relied on different reasoning, all nine agreed in

United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), that at least the long-term monitoring of a car's
movements via a GPS device qualified as a Fourth Amendment search, but it was disputed how
significantly that holding departed from lower court case law. Compare Brief for the United States at

42-44, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (No. 10-1259), 2011 WL 3561881 (arguing that
the lower courts had generally found that installing a GPS device was neither a Fourth Amendment
"search" nor a "seizure"), with Brief in Opposition at 19-22, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259), 2011
WL 2263361 (pointing to the absence of a conflict when the question was restricted to the long-term
use-as opposed to the mere installation-of the device).

4.
5.
6.

Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 541 (Kagan, J., concurring).
Id. at 542 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
See Wayne A. Logan, Cutting Cops Too Much Slack, 104 GEO. L.J. ONuNE 87, 88 (2015)

(expressing surprise that "Heien was met with near silence by the nation's editorial pages").

7. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).
8. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006).
9. Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 237 (2011).
10. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814-15 (1996).
11. See Atwater v. City ofLago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001).
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finishing up with a routine strip search if the unlucky motorist is placed in
the general population of a local detention facility. 13 Against this backdrop,
a jaded audience might well view Heien as just the last in a long line of
swipes at the Fourth Amendment. In the words of baseball legend Yogi
Berra, "[i]t's like d6ji vu all over again." 4
The temptation to minimize Heien's significance is fueled by the
opinion's deceptively simplistic rationale that law enforcement's mistakes
of law can be analogized to their mistakes of fact. But the cursory nature of
the decision15 should not obscure Heien's contribution to the Supreme
Court's gradual dismantling of Fourth Amendment rights. To crib once
again from the famed Yankee, the Court has "made too many wrong
mistakes" in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.1 6 Heien is not simply
another "wrong mistake"; it is a serious one. The Court's decision
substantially, and unjustifiably, expands police officers' discretion by
allowing them to make traffic stops, including pretextual ones, where the
driver did not even violate one of the myriad picky rules of the road. Given
the racial disparity in the incidence of these stops,' 7 the decision is likely to

exacerbate the growing tensions between law enforcement and
communities of color.
In making these claims, this Article proceeds in three parts. Part I
introduces the Court's opinion in Heien and critiques its reasoning.
Specifically, this part of the Article maintains that the Court's decision
cannot find support in Fourth Amendment precedent, offers no persuasive
justification for equating police mistakes of fact and law, contravenes the
maxim that ignorance of law affords no defense, and cannot be defended on
the ground that the line between legal and factual errors is too difficult to
draw. Part II then goes on to examine the potential reach of the Court's
ruling. Taking into account the lower court record on police mistakes of
law both before and after the opinion in Heien was issued, this part of the
Article predicts that the decision will continue to be extended to the more
intrusive searches and seizures that require a finding of probable cause; that
12.
13.

See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 175-76 (2008).
See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1513-14 (2012); cf id. at 1523

(leaving open a "narrow exception" for arrestees "whose detention has not yet been reviewed by a
magistrate" and who are "removed from the general population").

14. Nate Scott, The 50 Greatest Yogi Berra Quotes, USA TODAY (Sept. 23, 2015, 7:30 AM),
http://ftw.usatoday.com/2015/09/the-50-greatest-yogi-berra-quotes.
15. The majority opinion consumes only seven pages of the Supreme Court Reporter, and the
first two pages are devoted to the facts and decisions below.
16. Scott, supra note 14.
17.
See, e.g., LYNN LANGTON & MATTHEW DUROSE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, POLICE BEHAVIOR DURING TRAFFIC AND STREET STOPS, 2011, at 3, 7, 9 (2013),

http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pbtssl I.pdf (reporting a racial disparity in the incidence of traffic
stops, in the percentage of such stops that led to the issuance of tickets, and especially in the percentage
that resulted in a search); see also infra notes 345-47 and accompanying text.
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it will open the door to increasingly expansive conceptions of a
"reasonable" mistake of law; and that, if linked with other recent Supreme
Court opinions narrowing the Fourth Amendment, it will prove to be more
generous to law enforcement, perhaps forgiving even unreasonable
misinterpretations of law. Part III concludes, advocating that, if the Fourth
Amendment is construed to permit any police mistakes of law, it should
borrow from criminal law and excuse only those errors based on official
interpretations of the law made by a neutral and authoritative third party.
I. HEIEN'S REASONING
The Ford Escort in which Nicholas Heien was riding initially attracted
the attention of Sergeant Matt Darisse because the driver seemed "very stiff
and nervous."1 As a result, the officer decided to follow the vehicle,
pulling it over after a few miles because the right brake light appeared to be
broken.19 Darisse gave the driver a warning ticket for the alleged brake
light violation, but then asked for consent to search the car after becoming
"suspicious" because the driver appeared nervous, Heien had been lying
down in the back seat during the entire stop, and the two men offered
inconsistent responses when asked where they were going. 20 Heien, the
owner of the Escort, consented to the search, and Darisse's "thorough"
inspection uncovered "a sandwich bag containing cocaine" in a
compartment of a duffle bag.21
After losing his motion to suppress in the trial court, 22 Heien pleaded
guilty to attempted drug trafficking. The North Carolina Court of Appeals
reversed his conviction, however, finding that the stop of the Escort was
"objectively unreasonable." 2 3 The court's conclusion was based on its view
that a state vehicle code provision mandating that cars be "equipped with a
stop lamp," which "may be incorporated into a unit with one or more other
rear lamps," required only one working brake light.24
On appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court, the State elected not
to challenge the appellate court's interpretation of the stop lamp statute and
the state supreme court therefore assumed that no traffic violation had

18. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 534 (2014).
19. See id.
20. Id.
21. Id.; see Brief for Petitioner at 4, Heien, 135 S. Ct. 530 (No. 13-604), 2014 WL 2601475
(noting that the search lasted forty minutes).
22. See Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 535.
23. Heien v. State, 714 S.E.2d 827, 831 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011), rev'd, 737 S.E.2d 351 (N.C.
2012), af'dsub nom. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014).
24. Id. at 829 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-129(g) (2009)).
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occurred.25 Nevertheless, the court reversed by a vote of four to three,
finding that Sergeant Darisse's mistake of law was reasonable given
another vehicle code provision requiring that "all 'originally equipped rear
lamps"' must be working.26 Acknowledging that the question whether an
officer's mistake of law forecloses a finding of reasonable suspicion had
divided the lower courts, the North Carolina Supreme Court concluded that
reasonable suspicion does not require "omniscien[ce]" on the part of law
enforcement officials and that they can "make a mistake, including a
mistake of law, yet still act reasonably." 2 7 The dissenters criticized the
majority for opening the door to police misinterpretations of law that were
"less innocuous" than Sergeant Darisse's misreading of the stop lamp
provision and for introducing "the functional equivalent" of a good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule, which the North Carolina Supreme
Court had previously rejected under the state constitution.28
When the case reached the United States Supreme Court, Chief Justice
Roberts's brief majority opinion opened with the proposition, familiar in
the Court's recent Fourth Amendment case law, that "the ultimate
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness."' 2 9 "To be
reasonable is not to be perfect," the Chief Justice continued, noting that the
Court had previously upheld searches and seizures based on reasonable
mistakes of fact.30 Observing that "[r]easonable suspicion arises from the
combination of an officer's understanding of the facts and his
understanding of the relevant law," the majority could find no justification
for distinguishing between the two types of errors. 3 1
The Court then had "little difficulty" in reaching the conclusion that
Sergeant Darisse's mistake of law was a reasonable one and the stop of
Heien's car was therefore supported by reasonable suspicion.32 The Chief
Justice explained that the North Carolina vehicle code provisions used both

25. See State v. Heien, 737 S.E.2d 351, 354 (N.C. 2012), af'd sub nom. Heien v. North Carolina,
135 S. Ct. 530 (2014).
26. Id. at 358-59 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-129(d)).
27. Id. at 355-56, 358.
28. Id. at 360-61 (Hudson, J., dissenting).
29. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 536 (2014) (quoting Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct.
2473, 2482 (2014)); see, e.g., Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1970 (2013); Kentucky v. King, 563
U.S. 452, 459 (2011); Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 855 n.4 (2006); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547
U.S. 398, 403 (2006); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001). For further discussion of
the "touchstone" refrain, see infra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
30. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 536.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 540. Although there is some conflict on this issue, most jurisdictions require only
reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop, see 4 LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 9.3(a), at 474-75, and the
Supreme Court seems to be in agreement, see Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 536 (noting that the parties

acknowledged that the stop of Heien's car required only reasonable suspicion); see also Navarette v.
California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014).
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the singular and plural forms of the word "lamp," that even the dissent in
the court below found the appellate court's construction of the statute
"surprising," 33 and that Heien's case marked the first time the North
Carolina appellate courts had interpreted the stop lamp provision.
In a short concurrence, Justices Kagan and Ginsburg agreed with the
majority's determination that Sergeant Darisse's reasonable misreading of
the state statute did not undermine the constitutionality of the traffic stop.3 4
The concurring Justices wrote to emphasize the narrow reach of the Court's
decision, which in their view was limited to the "'exceedingly rare' case
where a statutory provision was "genuinely ambiguous." 35
Justice Sotomayor, in dissent, charged that the Court's willingness to
forgive police mistakes of law "[d]epart[ed]

from . .. tradition" and

"significantly expand[ed] th[eir] authority" to subject innocent persons to
intrusive and pretextual traffic stops. 3 6 Unlike the majority,

Justice

Sotomayor viewed the "reasonableness as touchstone" mantra as "simply
set[ting] the standard" to be used in assessing the constitutionality of a
police intrusion, and not as determining whether an officer's
"understanding of the law" is a relevant "input into the reasonableness
inquiry."37
In assessing Heien's reasoning, the discussion below first examines the
Court's Fourth Amendment case law and then evaluates whether the
Court's decision to equate mistakes of fact and law makes sense even if it
is not supported by precedent. The final two Subparts in this Part analyze
the relevance of the maxim that ignorance of law affords no defense and
consider whether the difficulties that arise in distinguishing mistakes of law
and fact justify the Court's decision.
A.

Analyzing FourthAmendment Precedent

In response to Justice Sotomayor's accusation that "scarcely a peep"
can be found in the Court's Fourth Amendment precedents supporting a
mistake of law defense,38 the Heien majority asserted that "none of those
cases involved a mistake of law." 39 Admittedly, previous Supreme Court
opinions had not squarely addressed the full import of a police officer's
legal error, but Heien was not the Court's first encounter with this type of
33. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 540 (quoting State v. Heien, 737 S.E.2d at 359 (Hudson, J., dissenting)).
34. See id. at 540-42 (Kagan, J., concurring).
35. Id. at 541 (quoting Brief for the Respondent at 17, Heien, 135 S. Ct. 530 (No. 13-604), 2014
WL 3660500; Transcript of Oral Argument at 48, Heien, 135 S. Ct. 530 (No. 13-604)).
36. Id. at 543-44 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 542.
38. Id. at 543.
39. Id. at 536 (majority opinion).
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mistake. Devenpeck v. Alford,40 cited only in the dissent (albeit for a
somewhat different point),4 1 featured a law enforcement official's
misinterpretation of state law. The arresting officer in that case thought that
the state's Privacy Act prohibited Alford from recording conversations with
the police during a roadside stop, a belief that was "clearly" wrong under
state appellate precedent.42 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held the arrest
was valid irrespective of the arresting officer's subjective motivations, so
long as there was probable cause to believe Alford had committed any
offense, even one completely unrelated to the alleged Privacy Act
violation.4 3 Devenpeck did not, however, sanction a Fourth Amendment
seizure for completely innocent behavior that violated no state law. And
notably, the Court's observation that probable cause turns on "the
reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known" to the police
suggests the Devenpeck Court at least assumed that an officer's views
about the law are irrelevant.4 4
The statement, in Devenpeck is not isolated; in fact, the Court's
references to excusable police errors on other occasions have focused
exclusively on mistakes concerning the facts of the particular case. In
Illinois v. Rodriguez, for example, the Court observed that Fourth
Amendment reasonableness requires "the many factual determinations that
must regularly be made by agents of the government" to be "reasonable,"
but not necessarily "correct."45 In addition, the Court has repeatedly
suggested that police have a reasonable belief of criminal activity only
when the facts it was reasonable for them to deduce actually constituted a
violation of criminal law. United States v. Cortez is just one of many cases
recognizing that reasonable suspicion arises when "trained law
enforcement officers" use "objective facts, . . . combined with permissible
deductions from such facts." 46 Similarly, Ornelas v. United States
40. 543 U.S. 146 (2004).
41. See Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 543 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (relying on Devenpeck for the
proposition that probable cause determinations do not typically consider the individual police officer's
subjective state of mind).
42. Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 151.
43. See id. at 153 (concluding that the officer's "subjective reason for making the arrest need not
be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide[d] probable cause").
44. Id. at 152 (emphasis added); see also id. at 155 (noting that an arrest is permissible when "the
facts known to the arresting officers give probable cause to arrest").
45. 497 U.S. 177, 185 (1990); see also id. at 184 (observing that "'reasonableness' . . . does not
demand that the government be factually correct" and that probable cause "demands no more than a

proper 'assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts' (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 232 (1983))).
46. 449 U.S. 411, 419 (1981); see also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002) (noting
that "due weight" must be accorded to "the factual inferences drawn by the law enforcement officer" in

assessing reasonable suspicion); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979) (observing that the
Court has consistently defined probable cause by referring to the "facts and circumstances within the
officer's knowledge"); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (pointing out that reasonable suspicion

2016]
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described both reasonable suspicion and probable cause as raising the
question whether the "historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an
objectively reasonable police officer, amount to reasonable suspicion or to
probable cause."A7 Although the Court described the latter part of this
standard as "a mixed question of law and fact," it was not referring to the
police officer's interpretation of the governing criminal statutes. 4 8 Rather,
the Court made clear that "the issue is whether the facts satisfy
the . .. statutory ... standard, or to put it another way, whether the rule of
law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated." 9
Given this extensive and one-sided record, the Court's equivocal
offhand comment in Herring v. United States that "a probable-cause
determination . . based on reasonable but mistaken assumptions" may not
"necessarily" amount to a Fourth Amendment violation presumably was
meant to refer to "mistaken assumptions" concerning the facts of the case.o
After all, the error at issue in Herringwas a factual one-a sheriff's office
computer database had not been updated to indicate that an outstanding
arrest warrant had been recalled.' Moreover, the statement was pure
dictum as the Court, "[flor purposes of deciding th[e] case, . . . accept[ed]
the parties' assumption that there was a Fourth Amendment violation" and
focused instead on the exclusionary remedy.52 Although the Heien majority
cited Herring's caveat with an unexplained "cf.," it is not obvious that
police mistakes of law were within the Court's contemplation at the time
Herringwas decided.53
The fact that Heien represents an extension of Fourth Amendment
precedent is not, of course, a fatal flaw, especially because, as the Chief
Justice suggested, most of the Court's prior case law involved factual errors
on the part of the police.54 The next Part therefore goes on to evaluate

requires that "the facts be judged against an objective standard"); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160, 175-76 (1949) (making multiple references in defining probable cause to "the facts and
circuttstances" confronting the officer (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161-62
(1925))).
47. 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996).
48. Id.
49. Id at 696-97 (quoting Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982)).
50. 555 U.S. 135, 139 (2009).
51. See id. at 137-38.
52.

Id. at 139; see also id. at 137 (noting that the parties agreed Herring's arrest violated the

Fourth Amendment but disagreed whether the exclusionary rule applied to evidence uncovered during
the search incident to arrest). For further discussion of Herring and the Court's rights-remedy
distinction, see infra notes 121-22, 311-28 and accompanying text.
53. See Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 539 (2014). For further discussion of Heien's
reliance on Herring,see infra notes 319-23 and accompanying text.
54. For discussion of the Heien majority's efforts to find support for its decision in other
Supreme Court precedent, see infra notes 119-32, 210-11 and accompanying text.
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whether the Court provided any other persuasive argument for comparing
law enforcement's mistakes of law and fact.
B. EquatingMistakes ofFact and Mistakes ofLaw
In the few paragraphs of the majority opinion in Heien offering an
affirmative justification for the Court's decision, the Chief Justice reasoned
that the rationales advanced to excuse law enforcement's reasonable
mistakes of fact call for equivalent treatment of their reasonable mistakes
of law: that police "deserve a margin of error" because, just as they "must
make factual assessments on the fly," they must similarly "make a quick
decision" when "the application of a statute is unclear." 55 Admittedly, law
enforcement officials may be called upon to act quickly at times, but there
are nevertheless important differences between their assessments of the
facts and the law. While there are a potentially infinite variety and
combination of facts an officer could conceivably face, there are a perhaps
large, but finite, number of laws. Even though some criminal statutes may
be ambiguously worded or of uncertain scope, the law is certain, or at least
knowable, in a way that facts are not. 56
Thus, the reason that probable cause and reasonable suspicion are, in
the Court's words, "fluid concepts," rather than "'finely-tuned standards'
that are "'readily . .. reduced to a neat set of legal rules,"' is not because of
imprecisions in the criminal code.s? Rather, probable cause and reasonable
suspicion are "elusive" because it is impossible to clearly and exhaustively
delineate how they apply to "the myriad factual situations" confronting law
enforcement officials.
Moreover, the Court's usual rationale for cautioning that the police
"deserve deference" in making probable cause and reasonable suspicion
determinations is that they "view[] the facts through the lens of [their]
police experience and expertise." 59 In United States v. Cortez, for example,
the Court noted that "a trained officer draws inferences and makes
55. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 539 (offering as an example the question whether a ban on vehicles in a
particular location applies to Segways). But cf Logan, supra note 6, at 90 n.30 (pointing out that
Sergeant Darisse was not required to make a hasty decision on the facts of Heien).

56.

See, e.g., Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 543 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that this concept "sits at

the foundation of our legal system"); cf Richard H. McAdams, Close Enoughfor Government Work?

Heien's Less-than-Reasonable Mistake of the Rule of Law, 2015 SUP. CT. REv. 147, 203 (2015)
(criticizing Heien for "focusing its analysis entirely on police officers" and arguing that, "[v]iewing a
government as a whole,... mistakes of law are never reasonable because a reasonable legislature writes
criminal statutes clearly enough to allow reasonable police officers to know what the law is").
57. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695-96 (1996) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 235, 232 (1983)).
58. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981).
59. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699; see also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002)
(requiring that "due weight" be given to "the factual inferences drawn" by police).
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deductions ... that might well elude an untrained person." 60 Deferring to
law enforcement officials' assessments of the facts is sensible because of
that training and expertise-especially when they are firsthand witnesses
on the scene. But the same cannot be said of their legal judgments. As
Justice Sotomayor pointed out in her Heien dissent, the police may well be
"in a superior position, relative to courts, to evaluate [the] facts and their
significance as they unfold," but judges are "in the best position to interpret
the laws." 6 1
Ironically, one of the justifications offered by the lone federal appellate
court that forgave reasonable police mistakes of law before the Supreme
Court's decision in Heien was that the police are not particularly expert
when it comes to statutory construction. 6 2 Specifically, the Eighth Circuit
concluded that it could not "expect state highway patrolmen to interpret the
traffic laws with the subtlety and expertise of a criminal defense
attorney." 63 In their briefs to the Supreme Court, both the State and the
Solicitor General agreed with that sentiment. 64 And it is for that very reason
that the rationale for deferring to police officers' evaluations of the facts
does not dictate similar deference to their legal interpretations.
In addition to finding little support in either precedent or policy for
equating law enforcement's mistakes of law and fact, the Heien Court's
decision to overlook reasonable police misinterpretations of the law seems
to be in conflict with criminal law's traditional approach to mistakes of
law. The Part that follows explores this tension.
C. Comparingthe Ignorance ofLaw Maxim
Since the mid-nineteenth century, the Supreme Court has endorsed the
principle, traced back to Blackstone, that "[e]very one is presumed to know
60.

Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418; see id at 419 (observing that, "when used by trained law

enforcement officers, objective facts, meaningless to the untrained, can be combined with permissible

deductions from such facts to form a legitimate basis for suspicion"); see also Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273,
276 (reasoning that police "draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences
from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them," and that the agent there "was
entitled to make an assessment of the situation in light of his specialized training and familiarity with

the customs of the area's inhabitants"); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990) (noting that
police are "expected to apply their judgment" to "recurring factual question[s]"); Terry v. Ohio, 392

U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (discussing the "reasonable inferences" an officer "is entitled to draw from the facts
in light of his experience").

61.
62.
63.

Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 543 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
See United States v. Sanders, 196 F.3d 910, 913 (8th Cir. 1999).
Id.

64.

See Brief for the Respondent, supranote 35, at 15 (quoting Sanders and noting that "officers

in the field should not be expected to be 'legal technicians' (quoting Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 695)); Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 25, Heien, 135 S. Ct. 530 (No. 13604), 2014 WL 3735672 (agreeing that "judges, rather than officers, are best suited to resolve legal
questions").

132

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 68:1:121

the law." 65 A number of the lower courts that took the view ultimately
rejected by the Court in Heien relied in part on the perceived injustice of
excusing only mistakes of law made by law enforcement officials. In
United States v. Chanthasouxat, for example, the Eleventh Circuit was
struck by "the fundamental unfairness of holding citizens to 'the traditional
rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse,' . . . while allowing those
'entrusted to enforce' the law to be ignorant of it." 66

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in Heien dismissed the analogy to the
venerable adage as having only "a certain rhetorical appeal" that
"misconceives the implication of the maxim." 67 Rather, the Court
continued, the "true symmetry" is that mistakes of law enable neither a
defendant to "escape criminal liability" nor the state to "impose criminal
liability."6 8
But the Court was drawing a comparison there between two criminal
defendants, not between the police and the general population. 6 9 The point
that criminal punishment may not be imposed or avoided based on a
mistake of law may be equitable from the perspective of different
defendants. While producing "symmetry" between various defendants,
however, it ignores the police. The ruling in Heien still creates a
distinction, one the Court failed to justify, between what police and
ordinary citizens are expected to know about the criminal laws.
Several justifications have been articulated for presuming that everyone
knows the law and therefore for refusing to permit criminal defendants to
raise their misunderstanding or ignorance of criminal statutes as a defense
to criminal charges.70 These policies underlying the famous maxim that

65. , United States v. Hodson, 77 U.S. (1- Wall.) 395, 409 (1870); see also Barlow v. United
States, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 404, 411 (1833) (reciting the "common maxim, familiar to all minds, that
ignorance of the law will not excuse any person, either civilly or criminally"); 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 27 (Univ. Chi. Press 1979) (1769)
("[E]very person of discretion ... is bound and presumed to know" the law.).

66. 342 F.3d 1271, 1280 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 196
(1998)); see, e.g., United States v. Nicholson, 721 F.3d 1236, 1242 (10th Cir. 2013); In re T.L., 996
A.2d 805, 817 n.39 (D.C. 2010); State v. Louwrens, 792 N.W.2d 649, 653 (Iowa 2010); Martin v. Kan.
Dep't of Revenue, 176 P.3d 938, 948 (Kan. 2008); Logan, supra note 6, at 91 (criticizing Heien's
"troubling asymmetry"); McAdams, supra note 56, at 196 (arguing that Heien creates "an ugly double
standard" by envisioning that "a statute can be sufficiently clear to give constitutionally adequate notice

to citizens, but also sufficiently ambiguous to excuse police searches and seizures based on errors about
its meaning"); John W. Whitehead, Is Ignorance of the Law an Excuse for the Police to Violate the

Fourth Amendment?, 9 N.Y.U. J.I. & LIBERTY 108, 118 (2015) (objecting to this "dangerous double
standard").

67. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 540 (2014).
68. Id. The Court's additional comparison here between "criminal liability" and "investigatory
stops" is discussed infra at note 214 and accompanying text.
69. See Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 540.
70. See Stephen P. Garvey, When Should a Mistake ofFact Excuse?, 42 TEX. TECH L. REv. 359,
366 (2009) (observing that "any. . . distinction" between ignorance and mistake of law is "one without
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ignorance of the law is no excuse apply with equal or even greater force to
mistakes of law made by the police.
Perhaps most fundamentally, the maxim is premised on the idea that
"the law is definite and knowable," 71 and everyone it governs has "the
opportunity . .. to find out" what conduct is prohibited.72 These
assumptions are considered particularly valid for those who act under
"circumstances that should alert [them] to the consequences of [their]
deed." 7 3 As Dan Kahan put it, "we expect 'repeat players' to be attentive to
the rules of the game." 74 Second, the maxim serves the utilitarian function
of providing an incentive to become familiar with the dictates of the law.
Allowing a mistake of law defense, the argument goes, would "encourage
ignorance ... and justice to the individual. is rightly outweighed by the
larger interests on the other side of the scales."75 Finally, the adage is based
on the concern that knowledge of the law is not readily susceptible to proof
and fraudulent mistake of law claims are not easily disproven.76
To be sure, the maxim has long had its detractors. Some critics have
pointed out, quite persuasively, that its presumption is "far-fetched" and an
"obvious fiction" because contemporary laws are so numerous, complex,
and intricate that the average citizen cannot realistically be expected to be
familiar with all of them.77 Dan Kahan has argued that, if encouraging
a difference"); cf 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW

§ 5.6(d),

at 407 (2d ed. 2003)

(equating the two concepts).

71.

Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991); see 1 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON

JURISPRUDENCE OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW 497 (Robert Campbell ed., London, John

Murray, 4th ed. 1873) (making the same point).
72. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 254 (1922).
73. United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 608 (1971) (quoting Lambert v. California, 355 U.S.
225, 228 (1957)); see also Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 433 (1985) (noting that the Court is
less likely to read a mens rea requirement into criminal statutes aimed at "conduct that a reasonable
person should know is subject to stringent public regulation and may seriously threaten the

community's health or safety"); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284-85 (1943) (finding
less "[h]ardship" in imposing strict liability on those who "have at least the opportunity of informing
themselves of the [law's] existence").
74.

Dan M. Kahan, IgnoranceofLaw Is an Excuse-But Onlyfor the Virtuous, 96 MICH. L. REV.

127, 150-51 (1997).
75. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 48 (Am. Bar Ass'n ed., ABA Publ'g 2009)
(1881); cf Kahan, supra note 74, at 140, 137 (arguing that the real goal of the maxim is to "discourage
loopholing" by the "imprudently inquisitive"). For pre-Heien opinions making this point in refusing to
overlook reasonable police mistakes of law, see, for example, United States v. Nicholson, 721 F.3d

1236, 1242 (10th Cir. 2013); United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1280 (11th Cir. 2003); In
re T.L., 996 A.2d 805, 817 (D.C. 2010).
76. See, e.g., AUSTIN, supra note 71, at 498-99; Livingston Hall & Selig J. Seligman, Mistake of
Law and Mens Rea, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 641, 651 (1941); cf Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 615
n. 11 (1994) (noting that difficulties surrounding proof of mens rea are a relevant factor in evaluating
whether a statute was meant to impose strict liability).
77. JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 378, 376 (2d ed. 1960); see also,
e.g., GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 9.3.4, at 731-32 (1978) (observing that the
presumption was "more plausible" when criminal law prohibited "obvious moral wrongs," and that
today "[t]he tight moral consensus that once supported the criminal law has obviously disappeared");
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awareness of the law is the overarching goal, a negligence standard is
"unambiguously superior" to strict liability because "the value of learning
the law is always higher when the law excuses reasonable mistakes."
Relatedly, some have advocated for a reasonable mistake of law defense, at
least under certain circumstances.7 9 And Justice Holmes discounted the
difficulty of proof rationale, questioning whether "a man's knowledge of
the law is any harder to investigate" than other issues courts are routinely
asked to resolve.80
Despite these objections, the courts in this country rarely allow
criminal defendants to argue they made a mistake in interpreting the
criminal statute they allegedly violated.81 And whatever the merits of the
criticisms as applied to the general population, they afford no justification
for affording greater leeway to the police. First, law enforcement officials
are the classic repeat players when it comes to the criminal laws. They
receive legal training, have an opportunity to seek advice from prosecutors,
and may well have access to technology that can immediately provide them
with the information they need.82 If, even with these resources, the law is

John M. Darley et al., The Ex Ante Function of the Criminal Law, 35 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 165, 181
(2001) (reporting results of empirical research finding that people have "no particular knowledge of the
laws of their states"); Hall & Seligman, supra note 76, at 646 (positing that "no one can know the law,

and of course no one does know the law on all points" (emphasis omitted)).
78. Kahan, supra note 74, at 133; see also Richard S. Murphy & Erin A. O'Hara, Mistake of
FederalCriminal Law: A Study of Coalitionsand Costly Information, 5 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 217, 231-

32 (1997) (making a similar point).
79. See Edwin Meese III & Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reconsideringthe Mistake ofLaw Defense, 102 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 725, 774 (2012) (arguing that defendants who can prove they made a
reasonable mistake of law ought to be afforded a defense at least for regulatory crimes); Kenneth W.
Simons, Ignorance and Mistake of Criminal Law, NoncriminalLaw, and Fact, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.

487, 523 (2012) (advocating a defense at least for reasonable mistakes of law); cf Garvey, supra note
70, at 368-69 (supporting a broader defense for even unreasonable mistakes of law so long as they do

not reflect the defendant's "defiance of the law's demands"); Richard G. Singer, The ProposedDuty to
Inquire as Affected by Recent Criminal Law Decisions in the United States Supreme Court, 3 BUFF.

CRIM. L. REv. 701, 706-07 (2000) (calling for a defense, or at least a reduced sentence, for defendants
who did not actually know their conduct violated the criminal laws).
80.

HOLMES, supra note 75, at 48.

81.

See MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 2.02

cmt. at 250 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) (describing as "the

conventional position" the view that "knowledge of... the law determining the elements of an offense
is not an element of that offense"); JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW

at 171 (6th ed. 2012) (noting that "[o]ne is never excused for relying on a personal

-

§ 13.02[B][1],

even reasonable -

misreading of a statute"); LAFAVE, supra note 70,

§ 5.6,

at 394.

82. See Wayne A. Logan, Police Mistakes of Law, 61 EMORY L.J. 69, 84 (2011); Whitehead,
supra note 66, at 116-17; cf Murphy & O'Hara, supra note 78, at 234 (pointing out that reducing the
cost of information alleviates the risk of overdeterrence). But cf Logan, supra, at 103-08 (advocating
that police receive more training, especially on substantive criminal law); Daniel N. Haas, Comment,
Must Officers Be Perfect?: Mistakes of Law and Mistakes of Fact During Traffic Stops, 62 DEPAUL L.

REv. 1035, 1047-48 (2013) (arguing that police cannot realistically be expected to have dashboard
computers).
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"simply too difficult for an officer to understand or learn, why should we
expect those without legal training to fare any better?" 8 3
Second, while the majority in Heien denied that its ruling would
"discourage officers from learning the law"-on the grounds that "[t]he
Fourth Amendment tolerates only . . objectively reasonable" errors on the
part of the police-criminal law does not excuse any mistake of law, no
matter how reasonable.8 4 And, finally, the argument that a mistake of law
defense raises intractable difficulties of proof militates against the Court's
decision to equate mistakes of fact and law.
At a minimum, then, the justifications for presuming familiarity with
the law apply equally to law enforcement officials and ordinary citizens.
But a criminal defendant's mistake of law does afford a defense in two
distinct contexts: where the error negates the mens rea required to commit
the crime, and where the misunderstanding is based on an erroneous
official interpretation of the law.86 The following two Subparts analyze
whether either of these exceptions to the maxim supports the result in
Heien.
1.

Mistakes ofLaw That Negate Mens Rea

A mistake of law, like a mistake of fact, is recognized as a defense in
the relatively unusual case where it negates the state of mind required by a
criminal statute.87 In Cheek v. United States, for example, the Supreme
Court ruled that a defendant charged with willfully failing to file a tax
return could not be convicted if he honestly thought he was exempt from
the income tax laws, even if that belief was unreasonable.8 8 Although
acknowledging the "deeply rooted" maxim, the Court reasoned that the
inclusion of the word "willfully" in the tax statute signaled that Congress
meant to require proof that the defendant "voluntarily and intentionally
violated" a known legal duty. In the Court's view, "the complexity of the
83.
84.

People v. Guthrie, 30 N.E.3d 880, 891 n.1 (N.Y. 2015) (Rivera, J., dissenting).
Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 539 (2014) (emphasis omitted).

85.

See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

§ 3.2(b),

at 7 (5th ed. Supp. 2015) (criticizing Heien for "unnecessarily introduc[ing] into the Fourth

Amendment adjudication process" a question "far more challenging and more subject to erroneous
resolution ... than the extant reasonable-mistake-of-fact rule").
86.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04 (AM. LAW INST. 1985); DRESSLER, supra note 81,

§

13.02[A], at 170.

87. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(1); LAFAVE, supra note 70, § 5.6, at 394. These cases
"almost always" involve criminal statutes that incorporate a legal element from some other body of law
and therefore do not excuse a mistake concerning the criminal law the defendant allegedly violated.
DRESSLER, supra note 81, § 13.02[A], at 170. For discussion of these different-law mistakes, see infra

notes 176-87 and accompanying text.
88. 498 U.S. 192, 201-02 (1991).
89. Id. at 199, 201.
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tax laws" explained Congress's decision to "carv[e] out an exception" to
the usual mistake of law rule for tax cases. 90
Assuming the Court's search and seizure jurisprudence could properly
be characterized as similarly complicated and difficult for law enforcement
officials to understand, 91 the Fourth Amendment, unlike, for example, the
federal statute criminalizing state officials' willful violations of
constitutional rights,92 does not require proof of willfulness. Even the
Court's decision in Herring v. United States concerning the scope of the
exclusionary remedy drew the line far short of willfulness, refusing to
apply the exclusionary rule only in cases of "isolated'.' negligence.93
The familiar "reasonableness as touchstone" refrain recited in Heien as
well as other recent Fourth Amendment rulings 94 could arguably be viewed
as incorporating a type of mens rea requirement into the Amendment. The
Court's interpretation of the constitutional
language banning
"unreasonable" searches and seizures has fluctuated over time and from
case to case. Historically, the notion of reasonableness served as a
shorthand description of the Fourth Amendment's warrant and probable
cause requirements, such that a police intrusion unsupported by probable
cause and a warrant was considered unreasonable unless it fell within one
of the many exceptions to those requirements. 95 In a few recent opinions,
however, the Court has construed the concept more broadly to trigger a
balancing test that deems a search reasonable so long as the government
interests it furthers outweigh the intrusion on the defendant's privacy
interests.9 6 Neither of these usages of the term unreasonable resembles a
state of mind requirement, however, and, even if they did, the negligence
mens rea implicit in the word "unreasonable," unlike willfulness, typically

90. Id. at 200.
91. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REv. 757,
757-59 (1994) (calling Fourth Amendment case law "an embarrassment" and a "doctrinal mess");
Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 363,
375 (comparing the exclusionary rule to "swiss cheese").
92. See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 104 (1945) (interpreting
the statute to require proof of "an intent to deprive a person of a right which has been made specific
either by the express terms of the Constitution . . . or by decisions interpreting them").
93. 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009). For a critique of Herring's focus on police culpability in
determining the reach of the exclusionary rule, see, for example, Kit Kinports, Culpability, Deterrence,
and the Exclusionary Rule, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 821, 838-43 (2013). For further discussion of
Herring,see infra notes 311-28 and accompanying text.
94. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014); Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452,
459 (2011); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).
96. See, e.g., Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1970 (2013); Samson v. California, 547 U.S.
843, 848 (2006); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001).
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does not create a mistake of law defense 97 Moreover, Heien's insistence
that a mistake on Sergeant Darisse's part about the contours of the Fourth
Amendment would have been irrelevant "no matter how reasonable"
implies an unwillingness to read a mens rea requirement into the Fourth
Amendment itself.9 8
Relevant to this discussion as well are the factors the Supreme Court
considers in determining whether a particular criminal statute was intended
to require proof of some sort of culpable mens rea that a mistake of law
could conceivably negate. In addition to the considerations outlined above,
the Court is more likely to find that a federal statute was meant to impose
strict liability when doing so will not criminalize a wide variety of innocent
conduct, 99 when the law is a public-safety measure intended to encourage
care in performing some dangerous activity,' 00 and when the statute
subjects defendants to only minor penalties. 0 1 These factors, too, militate
against the Court's conclusion in Heien.
Refusing to validate stops based on law enforcement officials'
mistaken views of the law does not pose any great danger to the public. The
police are presumably well-versed.in the statutes that prohibit more serious
breaches of criminal law.1 02 The cases in which they are wrong about the
law tend to involve traffic stops for relatively innocuous behavior such as
failing to use a turn signal when two lanes merge into one,103 hanging an
item like an air freshener from the rearview mirror,104 or attaching a trailer

97.

See Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 192-93 (1998) (pointing out that "the background

presumption" underlying the maxim applies even to statutes imposing the stricter mens rea burdenof

"knowledge" and that "[m]ore is required" only when the crime requires proof of "willfulness").
98. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 539 (2014); see also Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 64, at 27 (pointing out that because a police
officer's "subjective awareness of the law" is not relevant in applying "objective" Fourth Amendment

analyses such as probable cause and reasonable suspicion, "ignorance remains no excuse"). For further
discussion of police mistakes of law surrounding the dictates of the Fourth Amendment, see infra notes

326-38 and accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2009-10 (2015); Staples v. United States,
511 U.S. 600, 610-11 (1994); Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426-27 (1985).
100. See, e.g., United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609-10 (1971); Morissette v. United States,
342 U.S. 246, 254-56 (1952); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252-53 (1922).
101. See, e.g., Staples, 511 U.S. at 615; Morissette, 342 U.S. at 260.
102. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 35, at 34 (pointing out that mistake of law
questions "most often arise[] in the context of traffic stops"). But cf Logan, supra note 6, at 92
(observing that Heien applies to more serious crimes as well and thus has "a troublesome capacity to

expand").
103. See, e.g., United States v. Stanbridge, 813 F.3d 1032, 1033 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v.
Morales, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1291, 1293 (D. Kan. 2015); Robinson v. State, 377 S.W.3d 712, 715 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2012).
104. See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 95 F. Supp. 3d 1274, 1276 (D. Nev. 2015); State v.
Houghton, 868 N.W.2d 143, 146 (Wis. 2015).
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hitch or license plate cover that slightly obstructs the license plate.os In
many situations, these traffic stops are pretextual and merely an excuse to
investigate some other offense. 06 While that other criminal activity may
create a greater public danger, one cost exacted by the Fourth Amendment
is that the police must rely on some other investigative tool if they lack
reasonable suspicion to conduct a stop not only for the more serious charge
but even for some trivial traffic violation. 0 7
Additionally, the Fourth Amendment does not impose even a minor
penalty on a law enforcement official who makes a reasonable mistake.'s
In fact, the interest in safeguarding innocent conduct suggests that police
errors of law should not be permitted to give rise to reasonable suspicion
because in those circumstances it is the individual subjected to the stop
who was acting in complete compliance with the law. Thus, considering
both the handful of criminal cases excusing a defendant's mistake of law
and the Supreme Court's strict liability jurisprudence, the decision in Heien
cannot be defended by relying on the maxim's first exception for mistakes
of law that negate mens rea.

105. See, e.g., United States v. Flores, 798 F.3d 645, 646 (7th Cir. 2015) (per curiam); People v.
Gaytan, 32 N.E.3d 641, 644 (Ill. 2015); State v. Hurley, 117 A.3d 433, 435 (Vt. 2015).
106. For just a sample of blatant illustrations, see United States v. McDonald, 453 F.3d 958, 959
(7th Cir. 2006) (police stopped car matching the description of a vehicle that an anonymous informant

claimed was carrying drugs and a handgun); United States v. Rodriguez-Lopez, 444 F.3d 1020, 1021
(8th Cir. 2006) (defendant was stopped after exiting before decoy drug checkpoint); United States v.

Tibbetts, 396 F.3d 1132, 1134 (10th Cir. 2005) (narcotics officers stopped car suspected of drug
trafficking); United States v. Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d 282, 284 (5th Cir. 1999) (border patrol agent
stopped car suspected of immigration violations); United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 276 (5th Cir.
1998) (drug task force "sought to interdict illegal drugs by stopping motorists under the pretext of

enforcing traffic laws"); United States v. Morales, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1291, 1293-94 (D. Kan. 2015) (state
highway trooper was asked to stop vehicle federal drug officials suspected of carrying narcotics);
United States v. $167,070.00 in U.S. Currency, 112 F. Supp. 3d 1108, 1113 (D. Nev. 2015) (deputy
sheriff was told he "might be interested in stopping" a vehicle suspected of carrying a large amount of

money); State v. Williams, 934 A.2d 38, 44 (Md. 2007) (deputy sheriff stopped vehicle suspected of
carrying narcotics); Robinson v. State, 377 S.W.3d 712, 715 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (drug officers
stopped defendant after receiving anonymous tip he would be carrying cocaine). See generally Whren

v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (allowing pretextual stops).
107. See, e.g., Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987) (observing that an officer may
"follow[] up his suspicions ... by means other than a search," but if "no effective means short of a
search exist," "there is nothing new in the realization that the Constitution sometimes insulates the
criminality of a few in order to protect the privacy of us all"). For discussion of how easily police can

find a reason to stop a car, however, see infra notes 341-44 and accompanying text.
108. See, e.g., Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 544 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(observing that qualified immunity will "likely" be available in such cases); Robert L. Misner, Limiting
Leon: A Mistake of Law Analogy, 77 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 507, 528-30 (1986) (viewing the
exclusionary rule as an "institutional remedy").
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Mistakes ofLaw Based on Official Interpretations

Although the law typically does not forgive those who misread
criminal statutes, a second exception to the maxim is recognized if the
mistake was based on an official statement of the law. 0 9 Criminal law
allows a defendant to rely on such pronouncements even though they later
turn out to be incorrect on the grounds that the community should be
encouraged to comply with and not to second-guess official interpretations
of the law 0 and that punishing the defendant in such circumstances would
be tantamount to "entrapment by estoppel"' because the source of the
defendant's error was "misleading conduct for which the state should fairly
be held responsible."ll 2
The contours of the entrapment-by-estoppel doctrine align with the
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule recognized in United States v.
Leon11 3 and its progeny. In Leon, the Supreme Court refused to apply the
exclusionary rule where law enforcement officials reasonably relied on a
defective search warrant that was not supported by probable cause. 1 14 The
good-faith exception was then extended to cases where police relied on an
unconstitutional statute that authorized warrantless searches," 5 a court
clerk's computer arrest records that were out-of-date," 6 and "binding
appellate precedent" that was later overturned.' 17 On each occasion, the
Court reasoned that the remedy's deterrent focus is on law enforcement
officials and not other state actors, that the police "cannot be expected to
question" these official sources of information, that "objectively reasonable
law enforcement activity" cannot be deterred, and therefore that
"[p]enalizing the officer for [another public employee's] error, rather than
his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth
Amendment violations." 18

109.

See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE

§§

2.04(3)-(4) (AM. LAW INST. 1985) (recognizing such a

defense, but putting the burden of proof on the defendant). But cf Misner, supra note 108, at 523-24

(noting that this provision of the Model Penal Code is not followed in some jurisdictions).
110. See, e.g., LAFAVE, supranote 70, § 5.6(e)(2), at 413.
111. DRESSLER, supranote 81, § 13.02[B][3], at 172.
112. Hall & Seligman, supranote 76, at 683.
113. 468 U.S. 897, 922-23 (1984). But cf Misner, supra note 108, at 528-30 (rejecting this
analogy as a justification for the good-faith exception because the exclusionary rule does not punish the
individual police officer who acted in violation of the Fourth Amendment).
114. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-23.
115. See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1987).
116. See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1995).
117. Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 232 (2011). But cf Note, Toward a General Good
Faith Exception, 127 HARV. L. REv. 773, 779 n.63 (2013) (citing cases disagreeing whether Davis
applies when the precedent was merely persuasive rather than binding).

118. Leon, 468 U.S. at 918, 921; see also Davis, 564 U.S. at 239-41; Evans, 514 U.S. at 11-12,
14-16; Krull, 480 U.S. at 349-53. For a discussion of the good-faith exception and criticism of the
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The Supreme Court's ruling in Michigan v. DeFillippo is also in line
with the narrow entrapment-by-estoppel exception to the usual mistake of
law rule.119 In DeFillippo, the Court found that probable cause existed to
support an arrest "made in good-faith reliance on an ordinance" later struck
down as unconstitutionally vague. 12 0 The Court in Heien pointed out that
DeFillippo-likeHeien-involved "the antecedent question" whether there
was a "violation of the Fourth Amendment in the first place," rather than
"the separate matter" of what remedy ought to be available for Fourth
Amendment wrongs.12 1 Although DeFillippo therefore turned on
substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine, rather than the distinct remedial
question at issue in the good-faith exception context, that is not surprising
given that DeFillippo predated Leon's creation of the good-faith
exception. 122 In any event, the analysis in DeFillippomirrored the rationale
underlying both the good-faith exception and the "narrowly drawn"
estoppel exception to the maxim. 123 Explaining that DeFillippo had acted in
violation of a "presumptively valid ordinance," the Court was reluctant to
ask "[a] prudent officer ... to anticipate that a court would later hold the
ordinance unconstitutional." 1 24 "Society would be ill-served," the
DeFillippo Court concluded, if the police "took it upon themselves to
determine which laws are and which are not constitutionally entitled to
enforcement."l 2 5 In language that could have come from one of the goodfaith exception cases, the Court noted that "deter[ring] unlawful police
inconsistent deterrence analysis relied on in this line of cases, see Kinports, supra note 93, at 824-28,

835-43.
119. 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
120. Id. at 33.
121. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 539 (2014); see also Herring v. United States, 555
U.S. 135, 140 (2009) (admonishing that "[tihe fact that a Fourth Amendment violation
occurred ... does not necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies"); Leon, 468 U.S. at 906
(noting that "[w]hether the exclusionary sanction is appropriately imposed in a particular case . . is 'an
issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party seeking to invoke
the rule were violated"' (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223 (1983))).
122. This rights-remedy distinction has led some state courts that reject the good-faith exception
under their own state constitutions to nevertheless adopt the Court's substantive Fourth Amendment

ruling in Heien. See People v. Gaytan, 32 N.E.3d 641, 653-54 (Ill. 2015); State v. Sutherland, 138 A.3d
551, 558 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016); People v. Guthrie, 30 N.E.3d 880, 884 n.2 (N.Y. 2015); see
also State v. Simpson, No. 03-15-00499-CR, 2016 WL 1317964, at *4 (Tex. App. Mar. 31, 2016)
(reaching a similar conclusion where state's good-faith exception did not protect reliance on

unconstitutional statutes). But cf State v. Scriven, No. A-5680-13T3, 2015 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS
374, at *10-11 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 25, 2015) (per curiam) (in addition to finding officer's
mistake of law unreasonable, the court also distinguished Heien on the grounds that New Jersey does
not recognize the good-faith exception and therefore "act[ing] in good faith does not justify [an] illegal
stop"), af'd on other grounds, 140 A.3d 535 (N.J. 2016).
123. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04 explanatory note at 268 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
124. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 37-38.
125. Id. at 38. DeFillippo,like Illinois v. Krull, recognized an exception for statutes that were "so
grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional" that a reasonable person would realize they were invalid. Id.;
see Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 355 (1987).
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action" is the aim of the exclusionary remedy and "[n]o conceivable
purpose of deterrence would be served by suppressing evidence" where the
police were "enforcing a presumptively valid statute." 12 6
Despite the Heien majority's reliance on DeFillippo,127 that precedent
provides no greater support for the Court's holding than does either the
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule or the entrapment-by-estoppel
exception to the maxim. Heien endorses a broader mistake of law exception
than that recognized in any of these other contexts because it encompasses
cases where officers rely, not on an ordinance on the books or a warrant
issued by a judge, but instead on their own misinterpretation of the
governing laws.1 28 It may well be, as the Chief Justice asserted in Heien,
that "DeFillippo's conduct was lawful when the officers observed it" 12 9 in
the theoretical sense that the court ruling striking down the ordinance, like
any new constitutional decision, did not "creat[e] the law" but merely
"declar[ed] what the law already [was].,"1 3 0 But that observation, while
perhaps important when determining whether a new rule applies
retroactively or what remedies should be available for violating it,13 ' does
not change the fact that the officers who initially arrested DeFillippo were
"correctly applying the law that was then in existence" and therefore did
not make a "'mistake' at all."l32 Police are expected, in fact are generally
required, to enforce the laws on the books. What they are not supposed to
do is stop-or arrest-someone driving with only one license plate or brake
light who is acting in full compliance with the traffic laws.
In line with these various doctrines, a finding of reasonable suspicion
could be justified if police acted in reliance on a judicial interpretation of a
criminal statute, at least from an appellate court, that was subsequently
overturned.1 3 3 Whether a law enforcement official who consulted a local
126. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 38 n.3.
127. See Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 538 (2014).
128. See Note, supra note 117, at 777 (advocating expansion of the good-faith exception to
excuse any reasonable police mistake, though recognizing that the courts have not gone this far). For
discussion of the prospect that the combined impact of Heien and other recent Supreme Court opinions
could lead to this result, see infra notes 329-38 and accompanying text.

129. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 538 (citing Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 271 (2008)).
130. Danforth, 552 U.S. at 271 n.5 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith,
496 U.S. 167, 201 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)).
13 1. See id
132. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 546 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see LAFAvt, supra note 85, § 3.2(b), at
7 (arguing that the Heien dissent featured the "more faithful reading" of DeFillippo);see also People v.
Ellis, No. 1-14-0613, 2016 WL 1221730, at *11 (Ill. App. Ct. Mar. 28, 2016) (refusing to apply Heien
where officers reasonably believed the defendant had violated a weapons statute "considered valid at
the time," but later declared unconstitutional, because the case was not "premised on any officer's

mistake of the law"). But cf McAdams, supra note 56, at 155 n.38 (contending that "[i]t is a legal
mistake to enforce a legally invalid ordinance, even if the mistake is excusable").
133. See LAFAVE, supranote 70, § 5.6(e)(2), at 415 (noting that reliance on lower court case law
may not be reasonable and that some states limit the official statement of the law exception to appellate
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prosecutor, and was incorrectly informed that certain acts violated state
law, had the reasonable suspicion required to conduct a stop is a closer
question. Although prosecutorial advice might give rise to a defense in the
typical criminal case, 134 in this context the prosecutor is part of "the law
enforcement team" rather than a "neutral" third party with "no stake in the
outcome."1 35 In any event, each of these situations, like DeFillippoand the
good-faith exception cases, involves officers who were relying on a third
party's official interpretation of the law rather than, as in Heien, their own
misreading of the statute.
As a result, Justice Sotomayor was wrong to suggest that the good-faith
exception would apply on the facts of Heien in a jurisdiction that, unlike
North Carolina, had not rejected the exception under its own state
constitution.136 Although the dissent cited Davis v. United States in support
of that view, the good-faith exception was available in that case because the
officer was relying on "binding appellate precedent" and not his own
mistaken interpretation of the law. 13 7 Neither the good-faith exception to
the exclusionary rule nor the entrapment-by-estoppel exception to the
maxim is applicable when the error arises solely from the officer's own
mistake of law. And DeFillippo, which was based on similar reasoning,
should not have been extended to that situation either.
Thus, whether one considers DeFillippo, the Leon good-faith exception
line of cases, or criminal law's entrapment-by-estoppel doctrine, a mistake
of law ought to be forgiven only when the police reasonably rely on a
neutral and authoritative third party. None of these precedents or doctrines
excuse an erroneous reading of the criminal statutes made by the officer
decisions); cf Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 232 (2011) (recognizing a good-faith exception
where police relied on "binding appellate precedent").
134. See LAFAVE, supranote 70, § 5.6(e)(3), at 416 (advocating that the official statement of the
law exception should include prosecutors). For a qualified immunity case with these facts, see J Mack
L.L.C. v. Leonard, No. 2:13-cv-808, 2015 WL 519412, at *2-3 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 9, 2015) (prosecutor
mistakenly told officer that a state law banned hallucinogenic substances).

135.

United States .v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 917 (1984); see Misner, supra note 108, at 537-38

(arguing in the context of the good-faith exception that prosecutors, unlike judges, are not sufficiently
neutral); cf Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 35, at 32 (attorney for the State suggests that
advice even from a judge or attorney general would not necessarily render a police officer's mistake of
law reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes, though it might support granting her qualified
immunity).

136.

See Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 544-45 & n.2 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (listing fourteen states

that have rejected Leon); see also Orin Kerr, A Few Thoughts on Heien v. North Carolina, WASH. POST:
29,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhCONSPIRACY
(Sept.
VOLOKH

conspiracy/wp/2014/09/29/a-few-thoughts-on-heien-v-north-carolinal

(likewise taking the position that

Heien may not "make any difference as a matter of Fourth Amendment law" except in states that do not
recognize the good-faith exception). But cf Madison Coburn, The Supreme Court's Mistake on Law
Enforcement Mistake ofLaw: Why States Should Not Adopt Heien v. North Carolina, 6 WAKE FOREST

J.L. & POL'Y 503, 543 (2016) (arguing that the good-faith exception does not apply to "police-only
mistake of law cases").
137. Davis, 564 U.S. at 232.

2016]

Heien's Mistake of Law

143

herself, 3 8 and therefore the decision in Heien cannot be reconciled with the
famous maxim and cannot be justified by analogizing to either of its two
exceptions.
D. DistinguishingMistakes ofFact and Law
Although Heien can be faulted for its use of precedent and for its
attempt to sidestep the usual mistake of law doctrine, support for the
Supreme Court's decision can conceivably be found elsewhere in a
rationale not mentioned by the Court itself-that the line between mistakes
of fact and mistakes of law is too amorphous to be administrable. The
difficulties that arise in differentiating between the two, the argument goes,
justify giving them comparable treatment, such that no reasonable mistake
an officer makes is fatal to a finding of reasonable suspicion.
The North Carolina Supreme Court made this point in Heien,139 and
some criminal law scholars likewise maintain that the distinction between
mistake of fact and mistake of law is entirely "illusory." 40 Others disagree,
taking the position that there is an "important and coherent" difference
between the two types of mistake.141 Although on some level what the law
provides is itself a question of fact,1 4 2 "nonlegal 'facts"' differ from "legal
'facts."'l 4 3 Articulating at least the basic distinction between the two is
relatively straightforward. As George Fletcher has written, mistakes of fact
involve "misperceptions of the world," whereas mistakes of law arise from
"false belief~s] about the enactment or abolition of a legal norm."'" Or, in
the words of Peter Westen, the difference turns on whether one needs "the
services of a good lawyer" or "a good private investigator." 4 5

138. The one outlier here, Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009), is discussed infra at
notes 311-28 and accompanying text.
139. See State v. Heien, 737 S.E.2d 351, 358 (N.C. 2012), affd sub nom. Heien v. North
Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014); see also State v. Louwrens, 792 N.W.2d 649, 655 (Iowa 2010) (Cady,
J., concurring in the judgment); People v. Guthrie, 30 N.E.3d 880, 887 (N.Y. 2015).
140. I.H.E. Patient, Mistake ofLaw-A Mistake?, 51 J. CRIM. L. 326, 326 (1987); see also Mark
Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REv. 591, 631 (1981)

(describing the distinction as "nonsensical without considerable interpretive construction").
141. Simons, supranote 79, at 494.
142.

See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Inculpatory and Exculpatory Mistakes and the Fact/Law

Distinction: An Essay in Memory of Myke Bayles, 12 LAW & PHIL. 33, 52 (1993) (taking the position
that "all mistakes of law are mistakes regarding facts-those facts that are facts about the existence and

meaning of law"); Garvey, supra note 70, at 362 n.5 (making the same point).
143.

Kenneth W. Simons, Mistake of Fact or Mistake of Criminal Law? Explaining and

Defending the Distinction, 3 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 213, 221 (2009).
FLETCHER, supra note 77, § 9.1.1, at 686; see also Simons, supra note 79, at 494-95
144.
(defining a mistake of law as a "mistake about what the state prohibits" and a mistake of fact as "a

mistake about the instantiation of that prohibitory norm in a particular case").
145. Peter Westen, ImpossibilityAttempts: A Speculative Thesis, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 523, 535
(2008).
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Some academics advocate recognition of an intermediate category for
the mixed questions of law and fact that arise in applying a criminal
prohibition to the facts of a particular case. Without this third classification,
they argue, application questions are "forced into one inapt category or the
other."1 46 Others reject this intermediate group: instead, they treat it as "a
subcategory of questions of law"1 47 on the grounds that "[1]egal
,,148manantt
meaning ... lie[s] in concrete applications,
or they maintain that
149
application issues "can readily be unmixed into law and fact."
The academic divide is reflected in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence
on mens rea and strict liability, which has not been entirely consistent in its
characterization of these terms. Some cases, however, are relatively clearcut. In Cheek v. United States, for example, the Court acknowledged that it
was carving out an exception to the maxim and recognizing a mistake of
law defense when it held that defendants charged with willfully failing to
file a tax return have a defense so long as they honestly thought they were
exempt from the income tax laws, even if that belief was unreasonable.1 5 0
On the other hand, Staples v. United States established a mistake of fact
defense by requiring prosecutors to prove that a defendant charged with
possessing an unregistered machinegun in violation of the National
Firearms Act was aware that his semiautomatic weapon had been internally
modified so that it was capable of firing more than one shot with a single
pull of the trigger and thus "had the characteristics that brought it within
the statutory definition of a machinegun." 1 5' In recognizing this defense,
the Court repeatedly stated that a defendant "must know the facts that make
his conduct illegal."l5 2
An earlier opinion involving the same weapons offense, however,
illustrates the confusion that characterizes some of the Supreme Court's
decisions in this area. In that case, United States v. Freed, the Court held
that defendants charged with possessing unregistered hand grenades had to
be aware that the items in their possession were weapons but need not

146.

FLETCHER, supranote 77,

§ 9.1.1,

at 686.

147. Simons, supra note 79, at 495 n.23.
148. Gerald Leonard, Rape, Murder, and Formalism: What Happens if We Define Mistake of
Law?, 72 U. COLO. L. REv. 507, 592 (2001) (arguing that any distinction between "the abstract legal
'meaning' of a term" and "factfinders' applications of that statutory term" is "too evanescent to be

helpful").
149.

Simons, supra note 79, at 495 n.23; see also Simons, supra note 143, at 222 (arguing that

errors in applying the law to a set of facts "can readily be sorted into cases where that mistaken
application is based on a mistake of nonlegal fact [or] ... on misunderstanding of the legal norm").
150. 498 U.S. 192, 201-02 (1991); see also id. at 208-09 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment). For further discussion of Cheek, see supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
151. 511 U.S. 600, 602 (1994).
152. Id. at 619 (emphasis added); see also id at 605, 607 n.3.; cf id. at 622 n.3 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (expressly contrasting "the related presumption" that mistakes of law
afford no defense).
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know that they were unregistered.1 5 3 Although the majority opinion did not
address the mistake of fact versus law dichotomy, Justice Brennan's
separate opinion took the position that the registration requirement related
to "a legal element" involving "some other legal rule" rather than "the law
defining the offense." 5 4 When the mens rea issues surrounding this statute
returned to the Court in Staples, the Justices disagreed on the proper
characterization of the mistake involved in Freed. Justices Ginsburg and
O'Connor explained Freed's holding on the grounds that awareness of a
weapon's registered status is "so closely related to knowledge of the
registration requirement" as to be tantamount to "knowledge of the law."'1s
Justices Stevens and Blackmun, by contrast, viewed Freed as a mistake of
fact case.156

These varying accounts of Freed do not demonstrate the absence of a
bright line between mistakes of law and fact; instead, they reflect the need
to dig deeper to ascertain the specific source of a mistaken belief. Given
that the National Firearms Act assigns responsibility for registering a
firearm to the person who transfers it,157 the transferee would make a
mistake of fact if she was duped by a counterfeit registration certificate or
the transferor's misrepresentation that the registration process had been
completed. On the other hand, her error would be a mistake of law if she
was completely unaware of the registration requirement or did not realize
the weapon could not legally be registered to her because of her criminal
record. 58

Morissette v. United States provides another illustration. The defendant
there was charged with stealing federal property when he went onto
government land used as an Air Force bombing range (but also
"extensively hunted" by the neighbors) and took three tons of bomb casings
that had been "dumped in heaps" and left, "rusting away," for years. 9
Morissette's defense was that he lacked the requisite intent to steal because
he assumed the bomb casings were "abandoned, unwanted and considered
of no value to the Government."' 6 0 The Court held that the prosecution was
153. 401 U.S. 601, 607 (1971).
154. Id at 615 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02
cmt. at 131 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955)); cf Murphy & O'Hara, supra note 78, at 258 n.93 (noting
that the Freedmajority did not "clarify whether the mistake was one of fact or law").
155. Staples, 511 U.S. at 622 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment).
156. Id. at 631 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that Freed's refusal to require the
prosecution to establish that the defendant knew "the fact that the firearm ...

was unregistered" was

"squarely at odds" with the holding in Staples that a defendant "'must know the facts that make his
conduct illegal"' (quoting id at 619 (majority opinion))).
157. See Freed, 401 U.S. at 605.
158. See id. at 606; see also Simons, supra note 79, at 527 (suggesting similar hypotheticals to
make this point).
159. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 247 (1952).
160. Id. at 248.
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required to establish that Morissette had "knowledge of the facts, though
not necessarily the law, that made the taking a conversion," thus seemingly
rejecting a mistake of law defense.161 The Court then created some doubt,
however, when it went on to wonder how Morissette could have
"knowingly or intentionally converted property that he did not know could
be converted, as would be the case if it was in fact abandoned or if he truly
believed it to be abandoned and unwanted property." 1 62 Morissette came up
in the Court's recent opinion in Elonis v. United States, where it was cited
as an example of a case requiring knowledge of the relevant facts but not
awareness that "those facts give rise to a crime." 1 6 3 But, the Court
continued in Elonis, Morissette was entitled to an acquittal unless he knew
that "someone else still had property rights" in the bomb casings, which
sounds like a mistake involving property law.'6
The apparent confusion surrounding the mistake at issue in Morissette
does not stem from the inherent impossibility of differentiating between
mistakes of fact and law, but again points to the need for further
information about the basis of the defendant's misconception. If
Morissette's mistake was that he erroneously concluded the bomb casings
were "unwanted" and "of no value" to the Government, then he made a
mistake of fact concerning how the Government planned to use the
property or assessed its value. Alternatively, if he thought the items "could
[not] be converted" because they had been left in an area accessible to the
public and therefore were abandoned in the eyes of the law, his mistake
related to the law governing property rights.1 65
For a final example, consider a defendant charged with knowing
possession of a controlled substance. The defendant makes a mistake of
fact if she does not realize the white powder in her possession is heroin; she
makes a mistake of law if she does not understand that heroin is included
on the federal schedules of controlled substances. In last year's decision in
McFadden v. United States, the Court observed that a defendant could be
convicted of knowingly possessing a controlled substance if she knew the
item in her possession was heroin, even if she did not realize heroin was
classified as a controlled substance, because "ignorance of the law is
typically no defense., 66 But the majority then went on to suggest that both
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
the Court

Id. at 271.
Id. (emphasis added).
135 S. Ct. 2001, 2009 (2015).
Id.
See Leonard, supra note 148, at 538-39; cf Simons, supra note 79, at 489-90 (noting that
"seemed not to care what kind of mistake [Morissette] made"). But cf Dan M. Kahan, Is

Ignorance of Fact an Excuse Only for the Virtuous?, 96 MICH. L. REv. 2123, 2124 & n.8 (1998)

(describing Morissette as a mistake of fact case).
166. 135 S. Ct. 2298, 2304 (2015) (emphasis added) (observing that the prosecution's mens rea
burden could be satisfied by establishing the defendant knew either that the item in her possession was
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"the physical characteristics" of the item in the defendant's possession and
the item's inclusion on the list of controlled substances are "facts."1 6 7 As
discussed above, what drugs appear on the federal schedules of controlled
substances (like all questions about what the law provides) is in some sense
a matter of fact, 16 8 but whether or not a substance is "controlled" is, as the
Chief Justice pointed out, "a legal element" that depends on the federal
drug laws. 16 9
In addition to failing to delve into the specific reasons behind a
particular misunderstanding and therefore characterizing mistakes in
misleading ways, the Court has at times contributed to the confusion
surrounding mistake of fact and law by making seemingly disingenuous
statements denying that it is recognizing a mistake of law defense. In Bryan
v. United States, for example, the Court held that the crime of "willfully"
dealing in firearms without a license required the prosecution to establish
that the defendant "acted with knowledge that his conduct was
unlawful."1 7 0 The Court distinguished statutes that are satisfied with proof
of "knowledge" on the grounds that that mens rea term "merely requires
proof of knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense" and "does not
necessarily have any reference to a culpable state of mind or to knowledge
of the law." 17 1 But then, in what seems like an oxymoron, the Court
claimed that it was not "carv[ing] out an exception to the traditional rule
that ignorance of the law is no excuse; knowledge that the conduct is
unlawful is all that is required." 72

heroin or that, whatever it was, it was included on the list of controlled substances); see also Staples v.

United States, 511 U.S. 600, 606 (1994) (interpreting United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922), an
earlier controlled substances case that surprisingly was not cited anywhere in McFadden, as requiring
proof the defendant was aware "that he was selling drugs, not that he knew the specific items he had
sold were 'narcotics' within the ambit of the statute").

167.

McFadden, 135 S. Ct. at 2306 (distinguishing Staples because the weapons statute at issue

there "defined 'a firearm' by its physical features," whereas "the feature of a substance" that leads to its
inclusion in the federal drug laws is "the fact that it is 'controlled,"' and "[k]nowledge of thatfact can
be established . . . either by knowledge that a substance is listed . . . or by knowledge of [its] physical

characteristics" (emphasis added)).
168.
169.

See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
McFadden, 135 S. Ct. at 2308 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the

judgment) (arguing that ignorance of the law therefore should afford a defense if a defendant did not
know the item in her possession was listed as a controlled substance, even if she was aware of its
identity); see also Leonard, supra note 148, at 522 (positing that "every lawyer would agree" that
whether a particular drug is a controlled substance is "a question of law"); cf Simons, supra note 79, at
514 (concluding that it is "more plausible" to categorize this as a mistake of law, despite the fact that
"the criminal law incorporates a schedule of prohibited items," because a "primary function" of that
schedule is to "provide content to the criminal prohibition" and determining what substances are
included on the list is not "burdensome or complex").

170. 524 U.S. 184, 192 (1998) (quoting Ratzlafv. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 137 (1994)).
171. Id. at 192-93.
172. Id. at 196; cf id at 201 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (pointing out that the majority's "concession
[that knowledge of unlawfulness is required] takes this case beyond any useful application of the maxim
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Another example is Liparota v. United States, which concluded that a
conviction for knowingly using food stamps "' in any manner not
authorized by [the statute] or the regulations' required proof that "the
defendant knew his conduct to be unauthorized by statute or
regulations."1 73 Although the Court acknowledged that the statute's
"authorized" clause incorporated a "legal element," it denied that it was
creating a mistake of law defense. 174 Not surprisingly, in hindsight Liparota
is widely seen as a mistake of law case, though that view is not universally
shared.17 1

Opinions like Bryan and Liparotaare arguably open to criticism on the
ground that they reflect the Justices' willingness to "smuggl[e]" a mistake
of law defense "in the name of criminal intent" in cases where "it happen[s]
to fit their sense of justice," while at the same time "announcing the
continuing integrity" of the maxim. 17 6 But another explanation is that the
Court sees the maxim as applicable only in the "very rare" circumstance
when criminal law requires proof the defendant was familiar with the law
defining the particular offense with which she is charged. 177 Under this
approach, the maxim is not implicated in the more common case where
"the definition of [an] offense include[s] a legal element" related to some
other area of the law-the food stamp regulations in Liparota, the weapons
licensing requirements in Bryan-andthe defendant's mistake can give rise
to a defense by negating that mens rea requirement.178
Providing some support for this reading, the Bryan majority
distinguished Cheek as a case that did recognize a mistake of law defense
by requiring a defendant charged with willfully failing to file a tax return to
have knowledge of "the specific provision of the tax code that he was
charged with violating," whereas Bryan could be convicted even if he was
that ignorance of the law is no excuse"); see also Leonard, supra note 148, at 562 (observing that, "[o]f
course, [Bryan] really does" recognize an exception to the maxim).

173.
174.
the ...

471 U.S. 419, 420, 425 (1985) (alteration in original) (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1)).
Id. at 425 n.9; cf id. at 441 (White, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of "ignor[ing]

well founded assumption that ignorance of the law is no excuse").

175.

See Bryan, 524 U.S. at 193 n.15 (interpreting Liparota as holding that the mens rea term

"knowingly" "literally referred to knowledge of the law as well as knowledge of the relevant facts");

Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 631 n.15 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that
Liparota read the word "knowingly" to "connote[] knowledge of illegality"); Murphy & O'Hara, supra
note 78, at 264 (describing Liparota as "com[ing] as close as feasible to incorporating a reasonable
mistake of law excuse"). But cf Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2009-10 (2015) (viewing
Liparota as "requir[ing] knowledge of the facts that made the use of the food stamps unauthorized").

176.

Leonard, supranote 148, at 590, 592.

177.

DRESSLER, supra note 81,

§ 13.02[D][1],

at 175; see also MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 2.02

cmt.

at 250 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) (calling this situation "unusual").
178. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. at 250 (noting that here "[t]he law involved is not the
law defining the offense; it is some other legal rule that characterizes the attendant circumstances that
are material to the offense"). For discussion of mistakes of law that negate mens rea, see supra notes
87-108 and accompanying text.
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not familiar with the federal law "that required a license."' 79 Likewise, the
Court's explanation for why it was not recognizing a mistake of law
defense in Liparotawas that it would not excuse a defendant who knew she
was not authorized to accept food stamps but "did not know that possessing
food stamps in a manner unauthorized by statute or regulations was
illegal."so
Admittedly, the line between the criminal law and other bodies of law
is not always obvious. Although the Supreme Court viewed its ruling in
Cheek as creating an exception to the maxim,' 8 ' the statutory provisions
that characterize wages as "income" and require individual wage earners to
file tax returns are found in the federal tax code, not the criminal code.' 82
And Cheek provides no support for excusing a defendant who recognized
that she was required to pay taxes on her wage income but did not know it
was illegal to fail to file a tax return.
Criminal law scholars therefore disagree whether different-law
mistakes make up a justifiable and conceptually distinct category. Some
defend the distinction on the grounds that society can reasonably expect us
to be familiar with criminal norms, but not necessarily with every provision
of civil law.' 8 3 Others, however, point out that criminal statutes are also
numerous and complex, and argue that the same duty to know the criminal
code ought to be triggered when criminal statutes incorporate some other
aspect of the law.1 84 Still others maintain that the distinction between the
two types of mistakes of law is a difference "without substance and
function,"' 85 and that the connection between them "may be far more
intimate . . . if one interprets the legal system as something of a seamless

web rather than a separate series of pronouncements."

179.

86

And some deny

Bryan, 524 U.S. at 194-95, 199. But cf Leonard, supra note 148, at 562 (criticizing the

Court's distinction for assuming that an exception to the maxim requires that the defendant "know[] the

citation to the statute or its precise wording").
180. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 425 n.9 (1985); see also id. at 434 (noting that the
prosecution "need not show that [the defendant] had knowledge of specific, regulations governing food
stamp acquisition or possession"); United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 612, 615 (1971) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (denying that the maxim was implicated in that case despite the fact that
the firearms statute incorporated a "legal element" because it did not require "'consciousness of

wrongdoing' in the sense of knowledge that one's actions were prohibited or. illegal").
181. See supra notes 89-90, 150 and accompanying text.
182. See DRESSLER, supranote 81, § 13.02[D][2], at 177 (describing Cheek as a case involving a
"different-law mistake"). But cf Simons, supra note 79, at 515-16 (though acknowledging that this
characterization is "plausible," finding tax law distinguishable from other bodies of law, such as
property law, that are "the source of a wide range of legal obligations and remedies").
183.
See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 77, § 9.4.1, at 740; GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL
LAW: THE GENERAL PART 334 (2d ed. 1961).

184.

See, e.g., Leonard, supra note 148, at 553-59; Simons, supranote 79, at 505-08.

185.

Patient, supra note 140, at 329.

186. Kelman, supra note 140, at 631 (emphasis omitted); see also Leonard, supra note 148, at
547-51 (discussing the hazy border between the law defining the offense and other laws).
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that errors involving noncriminal laws can be equated to mistakes of law at
all. 187
Fortunately, despite the academic debates and the waffling found in
some Supreme Court opinions, the lower courts have had a relatively easy
time in Fourth Amendment cases distinguishing between law
enforcement's mistakes of law and mistakes of fact. United States v.
Miguel, the opinion the North Carolina Supreme Court cited in Heien to
support its contention that the line between the two types of mistake is
fuzzy, presented no serious challenge to the Ninth Circuit.' The Ninth
Circuit seemed to have no difficulty reaching the correct conclusion that
the officers made a mistake of fact in Miguel when they relied on a
computer database that erroneously indicated the defendant's car
registration had expired.'
A more complicated case is United States v. Cashman, where the
defendant was stopped for driving with an "excessively cracked or
damaged" windshield.' 90 If the Wisconsin statute at issue there had required
law enforcement officials to make a judgment call as to what constitutes
"excessive" cracking, the distinction between mistakes of law and fact
might have been problematic. For that hypothetical statute, one could argue
that an officer whose assessment was found to be incorrect had made a
mistake of fact, a mistake of law, or a mistake in applying the legal term
"excessive" to the facts of the case. But the Wisconsin statute specified that
an excessive crack was one extending more than eight inches from the
frame or into the windshield's "critical area," a term that was itself defined
as the part of the windshield a driver "normally used" to see in front of the
car, including the area covered by the windshield wipers.191 Cashman's
windshield featured a "substantial" crack seven to ten inches long that
"extended above the bottom" of one windshield wiper.' 92 "Given the
evident length of the crack and its proximity to the portion of the
windshield swept by the wipers," the Seventh Circuit found that the officer
reasonably could have believed Cashman was driving in violation of the
statute even if "[c]areful measurement after the fact might reveal that the
crack stopped just shy of the threshold for 'excessive' cracking."' 93
Probable cause depends on "a reasonable assessment of the facts, not a
187.

See FLETCHER, supra note 77,

§ 9.4.1,

at 739 (describing these mistakes as raising "a mixed

question, partly of fact and partly of private law'); Simons, supranote 79, at 501 & n.39 (observing that
courts recognizing such mistakes as a defense often consider them mistakes of fact).

188.
F.3d 1150
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

See State v. Heien, 737 S.E.2d 351, 358 (N.C. 2012) (citing United States v. Miguel, 368
(9th Cir. 2004)), aff'dsub nom. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014).
See Miguel, 368 F.3d at 1153-54.
216 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 586 (citing Wis. ADMIN. CODE TRANS. §§ 305.34(3)(a)-(b), 305.05(43) (1997)).
Id. at 587.
Id.
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perfectly accurate one," the court concluded, correctly viewing the case as
turning on a factual determination about the length and placement of the
crack on Cashman's windshield.1 9 4
Here, as in the Supreme Court's mens rea opinions discussed above,
difficulties in determining what kind of mistake is involved in a particular
case can often be resolved by ascertaining the basis of the officer's beliefs.
In City of Atwood v. Pianalto, for example, the defendant was driving in
excess of the 20 mph speed limit for that stretch of road but within the 30
mph limit set by state law for roads without a posted speed limit.' 95
Although the Kansas Supreme Court characterized the case as a "close"
one, with "a flavor" of both mistake of fact and mistake of law, the court
properly found that the case involved the former.' 96 Had the officer not
known that state law specified a speed limit of 30 mph for areas where no
limit was posted, he would have made a legal error. But the officer was
familiar with the law and instead made a mistake of fact by failing to
realize that the speed limit sign had fallen down.1 97 As the Iowa Supreme
Court pointed out in another case involving a missing traffic sign, "in the
majority of cases the type of mistake can be easily identified with the
officer's frank testimony as to what he or she thought the law was and what
facts led him or her to believe the law was being violated."' 98
This is not to say that the courts always make the right call in placing a
case on the law-fact divide. In State v. McCarthy, for example, an officer
who was incorrect about the location of a speed limit sign stopped the
defendant for speeding.1 99 Clearly, the officer was mistaken as to a fact
about the physical state of the world. The Idaho Supreme Court, however,
characterized the mistake as "one of both fact and law" on the grounds that
the officer was "mistaken about the fact of the speed limit sign's location
and about the law regarding the speed limit applicable ... at the

194. Id.; see also United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1277 (1lth Cir. 2003)
(agreeing with this interpretation of Cashman).
195. 350 P.3d 1048, 1049-50 (Kan. 2015).
196. Id. at 1053.
197. See id.
198. State v. Louwrens, 792 N.W.2d 649, 654 (Iowa 2010); see also People v. Guthrie, 30
N.E.3d 880, 892 (N.Y. 2015) (Rivera, J., dissenting) (noting that "any lack of clarity" in that case was
attributable to the parties' "fail[ure] to address what the officer believed" and not to "the inherent
difficulty of distinguishing a mistake of law from fact"). For other illustrations, see United States v.

Pena-Montes, 589 F.3d 1048, 1050-51, 1053-54 (10th Cir. 2009) (concluding, after resolving a "factual
ambiguity" and finding the defendant was using dealer license plates rather than demonstration permits,
that the officer made a mistake of law in believing dealer plates could be used only during particular

times of day and for particular purposes); State v. Houghton, 868 N.W.2d 143, 159 (Wis. 2015)
(recognizing that the mistaken belief that a vehicle was required to display both front and back license
plates could be based on a mistake of fact if the officer did not know the vehicle's state of origin, or a
mistake of law if the officer was unfamiliar with that state's license plate rules).

199.

982 P.2d 954, 956 (Idaho 1999).
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intersection." 20 0 The court thought that the two mistakes were "inextricably
connected, for the placement of the stop sign determined the applicable
speed limit." 2 0 1 But the court failed to recognize that the officer was
perfectly familiar with how the laws establishing speed limits worked. The
only basis for his mistake about the governing speed limit was a simple
factual error as to where the sign was located.
Conversely, courts do not always correctly identify mistakes of law. In
United States v. Tibbetts, for example, the defendant was stopped because
the tires he had installed on his vehicle were wider than the car's
mudguards (but not wider than the fenders or bumpers).2 02 The Tenth
Circuit, following its pre-Heien position that reasonable suspicion could
not be based on a mistake of law, characterized the case as one involving "a
mixed question of fact and law," and remanded for the district court to
evaluate whether the officer's belief that the mudguard law was violated
was "correct, a reasonable mistake of fact, or an impermissible mistake of
law." 203 But the officer was aware of the relevant physical facts-the
relative length of the, tires, mudguards, and fenders on Tibbetts's vehicle.
Rather, as the partial dissent noted, the officer made a pure mistake of law
in "ignor[ing]" the part of the state code providing that mudguards were not
mandatory "when the purpose of the statute is accomplished by means of
fenders." 2 04
As a general rule, however, the lower courts have not encountered
much difficulty differentiating between law enforcement's legal and factual
mistakes in ruling on motions to suppress. At the margin, tricky cases may
occasionally arise,205 but the rare situations where the distinction is
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id at 959 (emphasis omitted).
Id
396 F.3d 1132, 1138 n.4 (10th Cir. 2005).
Id at 1138-39.

204.

Id. at 1140 (Kelly, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For other Fourth

Amendment cases where courts have incorrectly identified mistakes of fact and law, see United States
v. Sanders, 196 F.3d 910, 912-13 (8th Cir. 1999) (suggesting that the erroneous belief that the
defendant's vehicle was manufactured after 1973 and therefore subject to a taillight statute was a
mistake of law); O'Callaghan v. City of Portland, No. 3:12-CV-00201-BR, 2015 WL 7734012, at *5-6
(D. Or. Nov. 30, 2015) (wrongly describing as a "mistake of fact and law" the officers' lack of
awareness of the fact that the defendant had filed an appeal); Cf Sinclair v. Lauderdale Cty., No. 15-

6134, 2016 WL 3402594, at *4 (6th Cir. Aug. 24, 2016) (characterizing the belief that one who was on
probation could be charged with "escaping" from a rehab facility as an "arguably mistaken application
of the [state's] unambiguous 'escape' statute [that] may fairly be characterized as a mistake of fact
regarding Mr. Sinclair's probation status," and granting qualified immunity on the grounds that the
mistake was reasonable) (amending the court's prior opinion, Sinclair v. Lauderdale Cty., No. 15-6134,

2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 11403, at *12-13 (6th Cir. June 21, 2016), which had identified the mistake as a
legal error).

205.

Compare People v. Guthrie, 30 N.E.3d 880, 887 n.5 (N.Y. 2015) (observing that an

officer's traffic stop for failure to comply with a stop sign, which had not been properly registered and

therefore was invalid, could involve either a mistake of law or fact "even if the officer knew of the legal
requirement that stop signs ...

must be formally registered . . ., but was mistaken about whether this
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elusive-such as the hypothetical "excessive cracking" statute discussed
above-do not justify the outcome in Heien. Moreover, any ambiguity can
often be resolved by ascertaining the precise source of the officer's
misunderstanding, and asking courts to do so is not particularly onerous.
In sum, there is much to criticize in Heien's reasoning. The ruling has
no real support in Supreme Court precedent, and the majority failed to
provide more than a cursory justification for equating mistakes of law and
fact. In addition, the decision to forgive police officers who misinterpret a
criminal statute cannot be reconciled with the maxim that ignorance of the
law is no excuse, at least when the officers are relying on their own
misreading of statutory language rather than official advice received from
an independent and authoritative third party. This critique might simply be
academic if extending the reasonable mistake doctrine to police officers'
legal errors advanced the goals of law enforcement without damaging the
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. Unfortunately, however,
while the eight Justices in the majority suggested that Heien will have only
a limited impact, their optimism may well prove to be unfounded. The
damage the Court's ruling is likely to do is the subject of the following
Part.
II. HEIEN'S REACH

The majority in Heien indicated that it meant for its holding to be
narrow, admonishing that the Constitution "tolerates only .. . [objectively]
reasonable" mistakes on the part of the police, that "sloppy" errors are not
reasonable, and that the Fourth Amendment's standard of reasonableness is
"not as forgiving" as that applied in the context of qualified immunity. 2 06 In
their concurring opinion, Justices Kagan and Ginsburg took greater pains to
emphasize the "important limitations" on the Court's ruling, which the
concurrence predicted would prove to be consequential only in unusual
circumstances. 207 In assessing Heien's potential impact, this part of the
Article analyzes in turn the realistic likelihood that the decision can be
restricted to traffic stops and other reasonable suspicion inquiries, the
elasticity of the concept of a reasonable mistake of law on the part of the
police, and the cumulative impact of Heien coupled with some of the
Court's other recent Fourth Amendment rulings. In all three areas, the
Article finds ample room for Heien's influence to expand; most troubling is
particular stop sign was on the list of registered signs" contained in the Village Code), with id at 892
(Rivera, J., dissenting) (commenting that the lower courts "easily" viewed this as a mistake of law
case).
206. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 539 (2014) (emphasis omitted). For further
discussion of the qualified immunity inquiry, see infra notes 238-40, 298-301 and accompanying text.
207. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 541 (Kagan, J., concurring).
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the possibility that the decision, when combined with several other
Supreme Court opinions, will excuse even unreasonable law enforcement
mistakes.
A. Applying Heien to Probable Cause Determinations
One obvious extension of Heien's reach is to apply it to searches and
seizures requiring probable cause. Although the Court was careful to limit
its description of the question presented in Heien to mistakes of law giving
rise to reasonable suspicion,208 the majority opinion referred to probable
cause as well as reasonable suspicion.2 09 In fact, the Court even relied for
support on nineteenth-century precedents "explaining the concept of
probable cause" in the context of federal statutes that protected customs
officers from damages suits so long as any unlawful seizure was based on
probable cause. 2 10 The Chief Justice acknowledged that these decisions
were not interpreting the Fourth Amendment and therefore were "not
directly on point," and in fact compared them to the "distinct" qualified
immunity analysis described elsewhere in the opinion as a more
"forgiving" standard.21 1 Nevertheless, the multiple references to probable
cause in Heien were made without any acknowledgment that a standard
other than reasonable suspicion was involved.
Moreover, despite the Court's practice of resolving some Fourth
Amendment cases by balancing the intrusiveness of a police action against
the governmental interests it furthers,212 noticeably absent from the
majority's opinion in Heien is any explicit endorsement of the argument
made by the North Carolina Supreme Court and Solicitor General that stops
impose only insignificant burdens, which might then create room to
distinguish the more serious intrusions probable cause allows. 2 13 In
rejecting the relevance of the venerable maxim, the majority did make the
somewhat cryptic comment that "just because mistakes of law cannot
208.
209.

See id. at 534, 536 (majority opinion).
See id at 536, 538-39; see also id at 545-46 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (likewise

discussing probable cause precedents).

210. Id at 536-37 (majority opinion).
211. Id. at 537, 539. See LAFAVE, supra note 85, § 3.2(b), at 6 (calling these cases "a slender
reed" on which to base Heien).
212. See, e.g., Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969-70 (2013); Samson v. California, 547
U.S. 843, 855 n.4 (2006); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968). For a categorization of the situations in which the Court directly balances Fourth
Amendment interests, see David H. Kaye, Why So Contrived? DNA DatabasesAfter Maryland v. King,
104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 535, 555 fig. 1 (2014).

213. See State v. Heien, 737 S.E.2d 351, 357 (N.C. 2012), aff'd sub nom. Heien v. North
Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent,
supra note 64, at 22-23; cf Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437, 440 (1984) (describing traffic
stops as "temporary and brief' intrusions of "comparatively nonthreatening character").

2016]

Heien's Mistake of Law

155

justify either the imposition or the avoidance of criminal liability, it does
not follow that they cannot justify an investigatory stop." 2 14 While this
statement may suggest the view that stops occasion a relatively minor
intrusion,215 only Justice Sotomayor's dissent spoke expressly in balancingtest terms, calling stops "invasive, frightening, and humiliating
,,216
encounters.
Not surprisingly, the lower courts have virtually unanimously 2 17
extended Heien to cases requiring probable cause, with one federal district
judge deriding the defendant's call to limit Heien to reasonable suspicion as
"border[ing] on frivolous." 218 Lower courts have therefore concluded that
police who made reasonable mistakes of law nevertheless had probable
cause not only to conduct a traffic stop 2 19 but also to arrest 2 20 and to
search.221 In fact, the Fourth Circuit simply cited Heien for this proposition
without acknowledging that the Supreme Court's opinion was not directly
on point.2 22
To be fair to these courts, it does seem fanciful to suppose that this
Supreme Court will object to extending Heien to Fourth Amendment
intrusions that require probable cause.223 After all, the two concepts are
closely related, and the Court often lumps them together, describing both in

214. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 540. But cf McAdams, supra note 56, at 184 (pointing out that the
Court "fail[ed] to follow through on its own logic" because "[i]f. . .the relevant and distinct context is
criminal investigation, then we should compare police and citizen mistakes of law specifically in the
context ofcriminal investigation").
215. Cf Logan, supra note 6, at 92 (suggesting that Heien may have been "motivated in part by

the view that being detained by police is a trivial event").
216. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 544 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
217. But cf Flint v. City of Milwaukee, 91 F. Supp. 3d 1032, 1058 (E.D. Wis. 2015) (expressing
"qualms" about applying Heien to an arrest, but engaging in an analysis of Heien "for the sake of

clarity"); State v. Shannon, 120 A.3d 924, 933 n.2 (N.J. 2015) (LaVecchia, J., concurring) (responding
to the State's supplemental brief citing Heien by noting that the Supreme Court's opinion involved
reasonable suspicion and "did not find justification for an arrest absent probable cause or a valid

warrant"); State v. Tercero, 467 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Tex. App. 2015) (refusing to apply Heien, in part
because it "dealt with the formation of reasonable suspicion" and thus was "distinguishable on its facts"
from a case involving "a warrantless, nonconsensual search of a person").

218. See United States v. Diaz, 122 F. Supp. 3d 165, 175 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
219. See People v. Guthrie, 30 N.E.3d 880, 883-84 (N.Y. 2015); Commonwealth v. White, No.
276 EDA 2015, 2015 WL 6690134, at *1-2 (Pa. Super. Ct. Nov. 2, 2015). For pre-Heien case law to
this effect, see United States v. Smart, 393 F.3d 767, 770 (8th Cir. 2005); Travis v. State, 959 S.W.2d
32, 34-35 (Ark. 1998); Moore v. State, 986 So. 2d 928, 934-35 (Miss. 2008). As noted above, see
supra note 32, most courts do not require probable cause for a traffic stop.

220. See Cahaly v. Larosa, 796 F.3d 399, 408 (4th Cir. 2015); Diaz, 122 F. Supp. 3d at 175 n.6;
Guinto v. Nestorowicz, No. 14-C-09940, 2015 WL 3421456, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 28, 2015). For preHeien case law to this effect, see DeChene v. Smallwood, 311 S.E.2d 749, 751 (Va. 1984).
221. See J Mack L.L.C. v. Leonard, No. 2:13-cv-808, 2015 WL 519412, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 9,
2015).
222. See Cahaly, 796 F.3d at 408; see also Guinto, 2015 WL 3421456, at *2.
223. See LAFAVE, supra note 85, § 3.2(b), at 5 (taking the position that Heien "leaves no doubt"
on this question).
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the same terms-as "commonsense, nontechnical conceptions" that depend
on a totality of circumstances that cannot "'readily, or even usefully, [be]
reduced to a neat set of legal rules."' 2 24 Reasonable suspicion, the Court has
said, is "obviously" a "less demanding" standard 2 25 than probable cause,
not only in terms of the "quantity or content" of information necessary, but
also the "quality" or "reliability" of that information.2 26 Perhaps that leaves
some room to argue that the higher quality of evidence demanded by the
more rigorous concept of probable cause calls for a more accurate
assessment of the law on the part of the police. But reasonable mistakes of
fact are not fatal to a finding of probable cause,227 and Heien seemed
committed to equating mistake of fact and law.22 8 Therefore, it appears
sensible to assume that Heien will continue to be extended to probable
cause determinations and thus, so long as an officer's erroneous
interpretation of the law is reasonable, will allow perfectly innocent
behavior to trigger a custodial arrest, 229 a search incident to arrest of the
2 1
3
person 23 0 and often of her car,23
and possibly even a strip search.232
B. Defining Reasonable Mistakes ofLaw
In applying its holding to the facts before it, the Heien majority had
"little difficulty" in characterizing Sergeant Darisse's erroneous belief that
North Carolina cars must have two functional brake lights as a reasonable
mistake of law.233 The Court acknowledged that the state statutes refer to a

224. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695-96 (1996) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 232 (1983)); see Kit Kinports, DiminishingProbable Cause and Minimalist Searches, 6 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 649, 651, 653-54 (2009) (pointing out that the Court has used terms like "reasonable belief'
and "suspicion" to refer to both probable cause and reasonable suspicion, and has relied on its
reasonable suspicion precedents in analyzing probable cause and vice versa).
225. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).
226. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).
227. See Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 536 (2014) (citing Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949); Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 802-05 (1971)).
228. See id.
229. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001) (interpreting the Fourth
Amendment to permit a custodial arrest for even minor offenses).

230. See
to arrest of "the
231. See
to the arrest of

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (allowing a warrantless search incident
arrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate control"').
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009) (permitting the search of a vehicle incident
a "recent" occupant of the car, so long as either "the arrestee is unsecured and within

reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search" or it is "'reasonable to

believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle' (quoting Thornton v.
United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment))).
232. See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1513-14 (2012) (allowing the
routine strip search of arrestees placed in the general jail population); see also Logan, supra note 6, at

92 (pointing out that a traffic stop can lead to an order to exit the vehicle, a frisk, "a barrage of unrelated
questions," and a request for consent to search).
233. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 540 (2014).
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singular "stop lamp" but noted that elsewhere they mandate that "all
originally equipped rear lamps" be operational.2 34 In response to the state
appellate court's conclusion that the term "rear lamps" does not encompass
brake lights, the Chief Justice replied that "the everyday reader of English"
would interpret the word "other" in the state statute providing that "' [t]he
stop lamp may be incorporated into a unit with one or more other rear
lamps' to imply that "a 'stop lamp' is a type of 'rear lamp."' 23 5 In
addition, the Supreme Court pointed out that the state appellate courts had
not previously interpreted the stop lamp provision and that even the
dissenters in the state supreme court had characterized the appellate court's
reading of the statute as "surprising." 2 36
Beyond the clues that can be gleaned from the Court's disposition of
this specific statutory interpretation issue, the majority provided little
content to its definition of a reasonable mistake of law. In response to the
concern that the Court's holding would create .an incentive for police to
remain ignorant about the law, Chief Justice Roberts cautioned that any
error must be "objectively reasonable" and that "the subjective
understanding of the particular officer involved" is irrelevant. 237 The Chief
Justice went on to add that the Fourth Amendment "inquiry is not as
forgiving" as the standard of objective reasonableness used in "the distinct
context" of qualified immunity, and "[t]hus, an officer can gain no Fourth
Amendment advantage through a sloppy study of the laws." 238 Otherwise,
the Court offered little guidance as to what constitutes a reasonable mistake
of law, leading Justice Sotomayor to criticize the majority's insistence on
leaving "undefined" the objective reasonableness standard it was
endorsing. 239 The dissent likewise objected to the Court's failure to
"elaborat[e]" on the distinction between the Fourth Amendment standard

234. Id. (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-129(g), (d) (2009)); see also id. at 542 (Kagan, J.,
concurring) (making the same point).
235. Id. at 540 (majority opinion) (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-129(g) (emphasis added)); see
also id at 541-42 (Kagan, J., concurring) (making the same point). But cf Kerr, supra note 136
(arguing that the term rear lamps refers not to the brake lights, but to "the red lights that go on when the
front headlights or parking lights are on").
236. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 540 (quoting State v. Heien, 737 S.E.2d 351, 359 (N.C. 2012) (Hudson,
J., dissenting)).
237. Id. at 539 (emphasis omitted).
238. Id. at 539-40; see also id. at 541 (Kagan, J., concurring) (agreeing that Heien's standard is
"more demanding" than the qualified immunity inquiry); cf Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982) (defining qualified immunity to protect executive-branch officials in § 1983 litigation so long as
"their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known"). But see Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court's Quiet Expansion of

Qualified Immunity, 100 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 62, 72-78 (2016) (arguing that the Court has not
justified applying different standards of objective reasonableness in the two contexts).
. 239. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 547 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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and the qualified immunity inquiry, predicting that the difference "will
prove murky in application." 24 0
But Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Ginsburg, wrote a concurring
opinion that expanded on these points. Agreeing with the majority that a
police officer's subjective views are "irrelevant," the two concurring
Justices read that to mean that law enforcement officials who are "unaware
of or untrained in the law" or who act in "reliance on 'an incorrect memo or
training program' have not made a reasonable mistake. 2 4 1 "Those
considerations pertain to the officer's subjective understanding of the law,"
Justice Kagan maintained.242
The concurrence went on to forecast that law enforcement officials'
mistakes of law will be deemed reasonable only in "exceedingly rare"
circumstances.243 The law in question must be "genuinely ambiguous,"
Justice Kagan elaborated, "'so doubtful in construction' that a reasonable
judge could agree with the officer's view." 244 Apparently hoping that
judges and law enforcement would get the message, the concurrence
reiterated that the criminal statute "must pose a 'really difficult' or 'very
hard question of statutory interpretation' and that rejecting the officer's
construction of the statutory language must "require[] hard interpretive
work." 2 45 Turning to the North Carolina laws at issue in Heien, the
concurring Justices agreed with the points made by the majority.246 Justice
Kagan observed that the state's various code provisions sent "conflicting
signals" and created "a quite difficult question" of statutory construction.2 47
Sergeant Darisse's interpretation "had much to recommend it" and a court
"could easily take [his] view," the concurrence noted.248

240. Id For further discussion of qualified immunity, see infra notes 298-301 and accompanying
text.

241. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 541 (Kagan, J., concurring) (quoting State v. Heien, 737 S.E.2d at 360
(Hudson, J., dissenting)).
242. Id
243. Id. (quoting Brief for the Respondent, supra note 35, at 17; Transcript of Oral Argument,
supra note 35, at 48).

244.

Id. (quoting The Friendship, 9 F. Cas. 825, 826 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 5125)). See Orin

Kerr, Reasonable Mistakes ofLaw Can GenerateReasonable Suspicion, Supreme CourtHolds, WASH.
POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 15, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2014/12/15/reasonable-mistake-of-law-can-generate-reasonable-suspicion-supremecourt-holds/ (noting that this seems "a much narrower test than a reasonable officer" standard).

245.

Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 541 (Kagan, J., concurring) (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument,

supra note 35, at 50). But cf Leading Case, Search andSeizure-Reasonable Mistake ofLaw-Heien v.

North Carolina, 129 HARv. L. REv. 251, 259 (2015) (observing that the concurrence's "superlative
terms" might be "reassuring on the surface," but they "offered little guidance as to what 'very hard' or

'really difficult' actually mean," and pointing out that "the difficulty of resolving a question of statutory
interpretation can often depend entirely on one's preferred interpretive approach").
246. See supranotes 234-35 and accompanying text.
247. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 542 (Kagan, J., concurring).
248. Id.

2016]

159

Heien's Mistake of Law

Heien is not yet two years old, and it remains to be seen whether the
concurring Justices' views are shared by their colleagues or whether the
concurrence was overly optimistic in predicting that the Court's ruling will
open a relatively small window. 24 9 The record in the eighteen months after
the opinion was issued is decidedly mixed. 250 Some courts have apparently
taken Justice Kagan's admonitions seriously and have been relatively
restrained in applying Heien, justifying their finding that a police error was
reasonable on the grounds that the case law interpreting the criminal
provision at issue was in conflict,25 1 the statutory language featured some
genuine ambiguity,252 or other courts had upheld stops in similar
circumstances.2 53

249.

See Leading Case, supra note 245, at 258 (noting that "a lower court might justifiably

question why [the concurring opinion's] reasoning attracted only two votes"); Richard Re, Can Justice

Kagan Narrow Heien v. North Carolina?, RE'S

JUDICATA (Dec.

16, 2014,

11:09 AM),

https://richardresjudicata.wordpress.com/2014/12/16/can-justice-kagan-narrow-heien-v-north-carolina/

(hypothesizing that Justice Kagan may have joined the majority opinion in order to engage in
"aspirational narrowing" and "put her own spin on the decision").

250.

The discussion that follows is based on a Lexis/Shepard's search of cases decided through

the end of June 2016. I looked at every federal court of appeals and state supreme court opinion that

mentioned Heien, as well as any federal district or state appellate court ruling that Shepard's indicated
did more than just cite the Supreme Court's opinion.

251. See United States v. Harris, No. 15-13972, 2016 WL 3522174, at *2 n.3 (11th Cir. June 28,
2016) (Florida appellate court interpretations of license plate statute were "factually inapplicable and
also in conflict with each other"); United States v. Cunningham, 630 F. App'x 873, 877-78 (10th Cir.
2015) (Colorado district judges differed on whether a signal must be used when turning onto a public
road from private property); United States v. Lawrence, No. 13-cr-10245-MLW, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 24514, at *7-9 (D. Mass. Feb. 25, 2016) (Massachusetts case law conflicted on the question
whether crossing the fog line is a traffic violation); United States v. Diaz, 122 F. Supp. 3d 165, 173-75
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (New York courts disagreed whether drinking alcohol in a "public place" included the
common areas of apartment buildings); State v. Hurley, 117 A.3d 433, 435, 441 (Vt. 2015) (Vermont
trial courts did not agree whether statute banning "hang[ing] any object, other than a rear view mirror,

in back of the windshield" covered items like air fresheners (quoting 23 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1125(a))).
But cf Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 250-51 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the
judgment) (arguing that extending the exclusionary rule's good-faith exception to cases where police

relied on "unsettled," as opposed to "binding," law might diminish their "'incentive to err on the side of
constitutional behavior"' in "'close cases"' (quoting United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 561
(1982))).
252. See United States v. Morales, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1291, 1295 (D. Kan. 2015) (concluding that
language was unclear, despite being "skeptical" that a statute requiring drivers to signal before
"tum[ing] a vehicle or mov[ing] right or left upon a roadway" applied where two lanes merged into
one); People v. Gaytan, 32 N.E.3d 641, 647, 652 (Ill. 2015) (finding reasonable the mistaken belief that
a trailer hitch mounted on the rear of a car violated a statute requiring that license plates be "clearly

visible" and "legible, free from any materials that would obstruct the visibility of the plate," where the
legislative history was silent and the court ultimately relied on the rule of lenity in construing the
provision narrowly (quoting 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-413(b) (West 2010))); Williams v. State,
28 N.E.3d 293, 294 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (explaining that while a statute requiring cars to have two
taillights that "'emit[] a red light,"' when "read closely," does not bar "other colors of light from also
being emitted, it certainly implies as much" (alteration in original) (quoting IND. CODE § 9-19-6-4));
State v. Sutherland, 138 A.3d 551, 557 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016) (reasoning that "there was no
authoritative judicial interpretation of [a] statute" that could be interpreted "to apply only to non-

working, required [vehicle] lamps" or to "any non-functioning lights"); State v. Dopslaf, 356 P.3d 559,
563 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015) (explaining that statute that prohibited crossing over a divided highway did
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Moreover, in other cases, courts have found that an officer
unreasonably misinterpreted an unambiguous statute and therefore made a
stop unsupported by reasonable suspicion. In United States v. Flores, for
example, the Seventh Circuit concluded that it was unreasonable to believe
a standard license plate frame violated an Illinois statute requiring license
plates to be "clearly visible" and "legible." 254 The court reasoned that the
officer admitted he could see "Baja California" once he got closer to the
vehicle and that it was "unrealistic" to assume the state legislature
"expect[ed] a wide segment of the driving population to remove these
conventional plate frames."255 Likewise, the Iowa Court of Appeals
considered unreasonable the judgment that an open container of alcohol in
a car parked in a private parking lot violated a statute governing vehicles
"upon a public street or highway," where street and highway were defined
as places "any part [of which] is open to the use of the public, as a matter
of right, for purposes of vehicular traffic," and the state supreme court had
found another criminal statute using the same definition of "public
highway" inapplicable to a drive-in restaurant's private parking lot.2 5 6

&

not "provide guidance as to the types of pavement markings required to establish an intervening space
or divided section"); People v. Abrucci-Kohan, 2016 WL 1174766, at *1 (N.Y. Just. Ct. Mar. 17, 2016)
(observing that one statute required "at least two" rear lamps, "one on each side," whereas another
suggested that all "lamps" must be "in good working condition," and the legality of driving with only
three of four taillights functioning was an issue of first impression in the state (quoting N.Y. VEH.
TRAF. LAW §§ 375(2)(a)(3), 376(l)(a))); State v. Hirschkorn, 881 N.W.2d 244, 246, 249 (N.D. 2016)
(noting that the court "had not interpreted the extent and interplay of the various statutory provisions,"
and "[a] plain reading" of one required drivers to "signal prior to moving or turning on roadways," even

though another simply required them to "stop at statutorily prescribed distances prior to exiting alleys").
For cases citing Heien in granting qualified immunity on the ground that statutory language was

ambiguous, see Dunlap v. Anchorage Police Dep't, No. 3:10-CV-00242-SLG, 2016 WL 900625, at *5
(D. Alaska Mar. 8, 2016) (citing "tension" between two state statutes, one prohibiting a driver from
possessing concealed knives and the other allowing "any type of weapon[s] . . ., so long as they were
not on his person," if the driver was "legally authorized to possess a firearm"); J Mack L.L.C. v.
Leonard, No. 2:13-cv-808, 2015 WL 519412, at *10 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 9, 2015) (reasoning that references
to "gas" and "vapors" in statute banning harmful intoxicants could include smoke created by synthetic
marijuana and that no state, court had previously considered whether the statute banned synthetic
marijuana).

253. See Morales, 115 F. Supp. 3d at 1295 & n.7; Commonwealth v. White, No. 276 EDA 2015,
2015 WL 6690134, at *3-5 (Pa. Super. Ct. Nov. 2, 2015).
254. 798 F.3d 645, 649-50 (7th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
255. Id at 649.
256. State v. Brown, No. 13-2054, 2015 WL 4468841, at *2-3 & n.5 (Iowa Ct. App. July 22,
2015) (emphasis omitted) (quoting IOWA CODE § 321.1(78) (2013)). For additional examples, see
United States v. Stanbridge, 813 F.3d 1032, 1037 (7th Cir. 2016) (explaining that turn signal statute
clearly applied only when "a driver intends 'to turn right or left' and not when pulling over to the

curb); United States v. Alvarado-Zarza, 782 F.3d 246, 249-50 (5th Cir. 2015) (reasoning that statute
was "unambiguous" and had been construed by Texas appellate court seven months before the stop);
United States v. Mota, 155 F. Supp. 3d 461, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (rejecting prosecution's attempt to
"read ambiguity into [a] statute" that "clearly" required only two brake lights); United States v. Sanders,
95 F. Supp. 3d 1274, 1285 (D. Nev. 2015) (finding unreasonable the belief that two air fresheners
hanging from rearview mirror violated a Nevada statute prohibiting driving with materials "upon" the
windshield, given thirteen-year-old Ninth Circuit precedent interpreting a "nearly identical" Alaska
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On other occasions, however, courts have been more generous in their
application of Heien, concluding that mistakes of law were reasonable
without any real analysis or explanation. In State v. Stadler, for example, a
car driving through a city park after hours was stopped based on the
officer's belief, "[fjrom [his] training," that "if you're inside the park after
city hours, it constitutes trespassing." 25 7 The Kansas Court of Appeals
upheld the stop, concluding that, even if the officer was wrong in thinking
the defendant was trespassing, the mistake was reasonable. 25 8 The court
offered only a cursory justification for its holding: "[b]ased on [the
officer's] training and experience, an individual's presence in the park at
1:30 a.m. constitutes a trespass." 2 5 9 Not only does this reasoning directly
contravene the Heien concurrence's warning about shoddy police training,
it also provides no explanation why the officer's interpretation of the
trespass statute was a reasonable one.260
Similarly, in United States v. Severns, the district judge's entire
explanation for rejecting the defendant's mistake of law argument was that,
even if the officers were wrong in thinking the state's concealed weapon
statute prohibited wearing in addition to concealing the knife the defendant
was carrying, their mistake "about what kind of conduct the statute covered
... was not unreasonable, especially in light of the dearth of case law

provision); State v. Stoll, 370 P.3d 1130, 1135 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016) (characterizing license plate light
statute as unambiguous); People v. Jones, No. B255728, 2015 WL 1873269, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr.
23, 2015) (pointing out that the law had been settled for more than fifty years); Darringer v. State, 46
N.E.3d 464, 474 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (explaining that the law had been changed almost a year earlier);
State v. Scriven, 140 A.3d 535, 538 (N.J. 2016) (concluding it was unreasonable to believe that driver
who passed a police car that was double-parked on the side of the road violated an "unambiguous"
high-beam statute that "required [drivers] to dim their high beams only when approaching an oncoming
vehicle"). For cases citing Heien in denying qualified immunity on the ground that statutory language
was clear, see Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Dep't, 785 F.3d 1128, 1132 (6th Cir. 2015) (holding
that "inducing panic" statute could not reasonably be interpreted to prohibit visible possession of a
firearm in an open-carry state that did not require gun owner to carry a license); Guinto v. Nestorowicz,

No. 14-C-09940, 2015 WL 3421456, at *2 (N.D. Ill'. May 28, 2015) (finding it unreasonable to believe
that stopping in a no-parking zone was a parking violation where city code defined parking to require an
"unoccupied vehicle"); Flint v. City of Milwaukee, 91 F. Supp. 3d 1032, 1059 (E.D. Wis. 2015)
(rejecting the contention that the fact that three unambiguous statutes had to be read together made the
mistake reasonable because "[s]tatutes frequently cross-reference each other and require some effort to
connect the dots"); J Mack L.L.C., 2015 WL 519412, at *9 (concluding that mistake was unreasonable
despite the fact that prosecutor told officer state law prohibited hallucinogenic substances because no
such statute existed and the controlled substance analog ban did not go into effect until two months
later).
257. State v. Stadler, No. 112,173, 2015 WL 4487059, at *2 (Kan. Ct. App. July 17, 2015) (per
curiam) (alteration in original).
258. Id. at *5.
259. Id
260. Cf Stoll, 370 P.3d at 1135 (noting that "[t]he state provides no authority for [its] reading
other than the deputies' own interpretation," and citing the Heien concurrence in reasoning that "the

fact that the department had trained its officers in a way that permitted a misreading of [the statute] does
not make that misreading objectively reasonable").
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discussing . . . the statute." 26 1 In response to the defendant's reliance on a
state supreme court decision that had interpreted the weapons statute, the
district court replied that it did not "read the [opinion] ... to have
definitively made . . . a determination." 26 2
In addition, other courts have found mistakes of law reasonable in the
face of seemingly unambiguous statutory language. In State v. Houghton,
for example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court deemed reasonable the
mistaken view that a statute prohibiting driving with "any ...
material
upon the front windshield" was an absolute ban on items like air fresheners,
even if they were not "upon" the windshield and did not obstruct the
263
driver's view.
The court reasoned that its conclusion to the contrary was
a "close call" and the provision had not previously been interpreted. 2 64 It is
not apparent, however, why the court considered the question difficult
given its acknowledgment that the statute "appear[ed] to be a strict
prohibition on a narrow group of items" actually affixed to the front
windshield.2 65 Another statute "applie[d] to all items," but only if they
"'obstruct[ed] the driver's clear view,"' 26 6 and the court concluded that the
"'common, ordinary, and accepted meaning"' of the term "obstruct"
required "more than a de minimus effect on the driver's vision."267
Likewise, in People v. Campuzano, the California Court of Appeal
upheld the stop of a bicyclist for violating a city ordinance banning bicycle
riding on "any sidewalk fronting any commercial business" even though
the businesses in question were on the other side of the street.26 8 The court
described the ordinance as "clear and unambiguous ... when read in
context" and concluded that the provision, by its "plain meaning," applied
"only on that portion of the sidewalk fronting commercial business
establishments." 2 69 Nevertheless, the court found the officer's mistake
reasonable, explaining that this was a case of first impression and the trial
judge had sided with the officer. 2 70 "It is axiomatic," the appellate court

261.
262.
263.
2012)).
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

No. 15-119-M-PAS, 2016 WL 3227667, at *2 (D.R.I. June 9, 2016).
Id. at *2 n.2 (emphasis added).
868 N.W.2d 143, 155, 158-59 (Wis. 2015) (quoting WIS. STAT.

346.88(3)(a) (2011-

Id.
Id. at 156.
Id. (quoting Wis. STAT. § 346.88(3)(b)).
Id. at 157 (quoting State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court, 681 N.W.2d 110, 124 (Wis. 2004)).
188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 587, 589 n.1 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 2015) (emphasis omitted)

(quoting SAN DIEGO, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE

269.
270.

§

Id. at 591 (footnotes omitted).
See id. at 592 & n.8.

§ 84.09(a)).
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asserted, that the officer must have been reasonable given that "an
experienced judge" misinterpreted the ordinance in the same way.271
Questions of first impression-like those before the courts in Houghton
and Campuzano o not automatically generate "really difficult"
interpretive problems. Perhaps the reason a statutory issue has not
previously reached the courts is because, as in those two cases, the
legislation's language is unambiguous. As the Supreme Court pointed out
in Safford Unified School DistrictNo. 1 v. Redding, quoting Judge Posner,
"[t]he easiest cases don't even arise." 27 2 Moreover, the fact that one or
more judges in the courts below agreed with the police should not
automatically brand the officer's mistake as reasonable. Obviously, the
officer was not relying on the views of those judges in misinterpreting the
reach of the statute. 27 3 And as Justice Brennan observed in dissent in Butler
v. McKellar, multiple "egregiously wrong decisions can be no more
reasonable than [one]." 2 74 Notably, some of the post-Heien decisions that

271.

Id. at 592 n.8; see also United States v. Cunningham, 630 F. App'x 873, 877 (10th Cir.

2015) (listing the district court's belief that the officers had correctly interpreted the statute as the first

of several rationales for deeming their mistake of law reasonable, explaining that, "[e]ven if the district
judge ...

was wrong in her analysis it was, beyond debate, reasonable"); cf United States v. Leon, 468

U.S. 897, 926 (1984) (finding officer's reliance on a search warrant reasonable for purposes of the
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, in part because "the divided panel of the Court of
Appeals" reflected "disagreement among thoughtful and competent judges as to the existence of

probable cause"); Sinclair v. Lauderdale Cty., No. 15-6134, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 15855, at *13-14
(6th Cit. Aug. 24, 2016) (noting, in granting qualified immunity, that even if Sinclair was on probation
and therefore ineligible for prosecution under the clear terms of the Tennessee escape statute, the
officer's mistake was reasonable because he relied on the trial judge's order warning Sinclair he could
be charged with escape and the prosecutor's belief that the statute applied to these circumstances);

Aleynikov v. McSwain, No. 15-1170 (KM), 2016 WL 3398581, at *13 (D.N.J. June 15, 2016) (likewise
concluding that mistake was reasonable and granting qualified immunity, explaining that "[tirained
prosecutors accepted the theory of prosecution [and] [m]ore to the point, a federal district judge twice
analyzed and accepted it").

272.

557 U.S. 364, 377 (2009) (quoting K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 1990)).

273.
Such reliance could, however, trigger the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule,
which is discussed supra at notes 113-18 and accompanying text.

227,

274. 494 U.S. 407, 421 n.2 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Sawyer v, Smith, 497 U.S.
249 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (pointing out that "[s]ome courts will

misconstrue. . . precedents notwithstanding their clarity"). But cf Re, supra note 249 (wondering
whether the concurrence's "'reasonable judge' standard [is] satisfied whenever a case involves
jurisdictional splits or even dissenting opinions"). For analysis of the comparable issues that have arisen
in other contexts, see Kit Kinports, Habeas Corpus, Qualified Immunity, and Crystal Balls: Predicting

the Course of ConstitutionalLaw, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 115, 144-45, 160, 187 (1991) (discussing the
Supreme Court's treatment of qualified immunity, procedural defaults by habeas petitioners, and
retroactive application of new constitutional rules); Stephen R. Reinhardt, The Demise of Habeas
Corpus and the Rise of Qualified Immunity: The Court's Ever Increasing Limitations on the
Development and Enforcement of Constitutional Rights and Some Particularly Unfortunate

Consequences, 113 MICH. L. REv. 1219,
jurisprudence).

1224-29 (2015) (addressing the Court's AEDPA
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have found police mistakes of law unreasonable reversed lower court
rulings that had endorsed the officers' interpretations.27 5
Given that the Eighth Circuit was the only federal appellate court that
took the position ultimately adopted in Heien and numerous state (as well
as federal) courts refused to tolerate stops based on mistakes of law, it is
plausible that courts for which the decision in Heien marks a change in
approach might move slowly in excusing legal errors made by law
enforcement. Some of the lower court opinions cited above that have
seemingly taken the Heien concurrence's admonitions seriously have in
fact been issued by courts that previously took the view that reasonable
suspicion cannot be based on a misinterpretation of state law. 2 76 But the
pattern does not hold for all cases, as some of the courts that have
interpreted Heien more generously have done so even though the Supreme
Court's ruling represented a "stark contrast" from their precedent. 27 7 And,
interestingly, some state supreme courts that had sided with defendants on
this issue prior to Heien have even adopted the Supreme Court's decision
as a matter of state law, declining to interpret their own state constitutions
to require a different result.27 8
To date, none of the opinions that have narrowly construed Heien's
notion of a reasonable mistake of law have come from jurisdictions that
chose the position eventually endorsed by the Supreme Court.279 Unless
those courts deviate from past practice and feel constrained by the Heien
concurrence, however, some of their pre-Heien case law suggests they can
275. See United States v. Stanbridge, 813 F.3d 1032, 1033 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v.
Flores, 798 F.3d 645, 646-47 (7th Cir. 2015) (per curiam); United States v. Alvarado-Zarza, 782 F.3d
246, 248 (5th Cir. 2015); State v. Stoll, 370 P.3d 1130, 1131-32 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016); State v. Brown,
No. 13-2054, 2015 'WL 4468841, at *1, *3 (Iowa Ct. App. July 22, 2015).
276. See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 95 F. Supp. 3d 1274, 1277 (D. Nev. 2015); People v.
Gaytan, 32 N.E.3d 641, 651 (Ill. 2015); Williams v. State, 28 N.E.3d 293, 294-95 (Ind. Ct. App. 21015);
State v. Scriven, 140 A.3d 535, 544-45 (N.J. 2016).
277. State v. Houghton, 868 N.W.2d 143, 154 (Wis. 2015); see also id. at 152, 156, 158-59
(noting that Heien was "at odds" with that court's prior rulings, but nonetheless finding mistake
reasonable in the face of unambiguous statutory language). For other illustrations, compare People v.

Campuzano, 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 587, 591-92 & n.8 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 2015) (concluding that
mistake was reasonable despite clear statutory language), and State v. Stadler, No. 112,173, 2015 WL
4487059, at *5 (Kan. Ct. App. July 17, 2015) (per curiam) (finding mistake reasonable, without any real
analysis, based on officer's training and experience), with People v. Ramirez, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 813, 816
(Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that mistakes of law cannot give rise to reasonable suspicion), and Martin
v. Kan. Dep't of Revenue, 176 P.3d 938, 948 (Kan. 2008) (same).
278. See Gaytan, 32 N.E.3d at 653-54; People v. Guthrie, 30 N.E.3d 880, 886-87 (N.Y. 2015);
Houghton, 868 N.W.2d at 152-55. But cf Coburn, supra note 136, at 541-42 (urging state courts not to
follow Heien).

279. Cf State v. Eldridge, No. COA16-173, 2016 WL 5030401, at *5 (N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 20,
2016) (concluding that officer's mistake was unreasonable because the statute requiring an exterior
mirror plainly applied only to vehicles "registered in this State" (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-126(b)
(2009))); State v. Lerma, No. 27450, 2016 WL 4396161, at *2-3 (S.D. Aug, 17, 2016) (finding mistake
reasonable in a case similar to Heien where the statute used both the singular and plural forms of the
term "stop lamp").
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be expected to characterize a wide variety of police mistakes of law as
reasonable.
In a case similar to Heien, for example, the Mississippi Supreme Court
found an officer's mistaken belief that state law required two functioning
taillights to be reasonable despite the fact that the governing statute in that
state unambiguously required only one.280 In justifying its decision, the
court made the conclusory and circular statement that the officer had
probable cause to stop the defendant's car "based on the totality of the
circumstances with which [he] was confronted, including a valid,
reasonable belief that [the defendant] was violating a traffic law." 2 81 As the
dissenting justices charitably put it, the majority was willing to assume,
"with absolutely no proof in the record," that the error was reasonable
simply based on the officer's subjective representation, "I thought it was
against the law." 2 82 In an earlier ruling, the same court likewise upheld a
traffic stop for speeding in a construction zone despite acknowledging that
the relevant statute had "a clear and definite meaning" and applied only
when construction workers were present. 2 83 Nevertheless, the court
reasoned that the defendant was exceeding the posted speed limit and the
trial judge and half of the appellate judges who had ruled on the
defendant's case erroneously thought he was violating the law even though
no workers were in the vicinity when he was stopped at 1:30 a.m. 28 4
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Heien, a number of other
courts upheld traffic stops of out-of-state drivers whose cars were. in full
compliance with the vehicular requirements in their home states. Even
though the applicable state rules were unambiguous, the courts reasoned
that their law enforcement officials could not reasonably be expected to be
familiar with laws in other jurisdictions.28 5 But none of these opinions
explained why, assuming the officers realized the vehicles were from
another state, it was not. more plausible to presume the drivers were
following the law, given that it is common knowledge state rules vary on,
for example, front license plates. 2 86
280.

See MISS. CODE ANN.

with at least one (1) rear lamp ....

§ 63-7-13(3)

(2013) ("Every motor vehicle... shall be equipped

).

281. Moore v. State, 986 So. 2d 928, 935 (Miss. 2008).
282. Id at 937, 939 (Dickinson, J., dissenting).
283. Harrison v. State, 800 So. 2d 1134, 1137 (Miss. 2001).
284. See id at 1139.
285. See Travis v. State, 959 S.W.2d 32, 34-35 (Ark. 1998) (expiration sticker on license plate);
People v. Glick, 250 Cal. Rptr. 315, 319 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (registration tags on license plate); People
v. Estrella, 893 N.E.2d 134, 135 (N.Y. 2008) (excessive tinting of windows).
286. See State v. Houghton, 868 N.W.2d 143, 159 (Wis. 2015) (reasoning that such a mistake
was unreasonable because "Wisconsin borders four other states, and residents from those and many
other states pass through Wisconsin on a regular basis"); cf Hall & Seligman, supra note 76, at 656
(noting that mistakes of law afford no defense even to criminal defendants who are new to a community
and come from a culture with different rules). But cf McAdams, supra note 56, at 193 (arguing that
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When a case involving an out-of-state vehicle reached the Eighth
Circuit in United States v. Smart, the court denied that the police officer
had even made a mistake of law.2 87 The officer would have been mistaken
about the law, the court reasoned, had he believed that "all states required
two [license] plates or that Georgia required two plates." 2 88 But because the
officer was aware the defendant's vehicle was from Georgia and
"knew ... he was unfamiliar with Georgia's requirements," the court
thought that he had made neither a mistake of fact nor a mistake of law. 28 9
In fact, however, the defendant's car was in full compliance with Georgia's
requirement of a single back license plate, and the courts generally do not
draw a distinction between ignorance and mistake of law. 2 90
The Eighth Circuit went on in Smart to conclude that the officer's
belief, even if based on a mistake of law, was reasonable-despite the fact
that the court acknowledged the officer "likely" could have verified the
validity of his suspicions at the time of the stop. 29 1 In United States v.
Washington, the same court subsequently found a mistake of law
unreasonable, but left room for prosecutors to introduce evidence of law
enforcement "manuals or training materials," as well as "state custom or
practice," to support the reasonableness of an officer's misinterpretation of
the law.2 92
Neither Smart nor Washington is consistent with the limited conception
of Heien's reach endorsed in the concurrence. Justice Kagan specifically
denied that a mistake could be justified simply because the officer was
"unaware of or untrained in the law." 2 93 She likewise took the position that
the police could not defend the reasonableness of a mistake by relying on
improper training.29 4 And taking into account local police customs is

these police errors should be excused because "[i]t is less important to motivate the police to know the

law of another jurisdiction").
287. 393 F.3d 767, 769-70 (8th Cir. 2005).
288. Id.
289. Id. at 770.
290. See supranote 70.
291. Smart, 393 F.3d at 769-71.
292. 455 F.3d 824, 828 (8th Cir. 2006).
293. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 541 (2014) (Kagan, J., concurring); see also Flint
v. City of Milwaukee, 91 F. Supp. 3d 1032, 1058, 1059 (E.D. Wis. 2015) (citing the Heien concurrence
in a qualified immunity case for the proposition that police "cannot make a reasonable mistake about
the law or the facts if [they have] no knowledge of either" and therefore "cannot shore up their lack of
knowledge by proposing that if they had properly reviewed the law they would have been nonetheless
confused"). But cf Coburn, supra note 136, at 523 (maintaining that Heien did not specify whether an
officer can be reasonably mistaken about "the very existence" of a criminal statute or a "recently
overturned" statute).

294.

See Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 541 (Kagan, J., concurring). But cf 4 LAFAVE, supra note 3,

§ 9.5(a), at 648-52

(pointing out that courts consider a police officer's training and experience relevant
in assessing reasonable suspicion despite the fact that it is an objective standard); Re, supra note 249

(noting that the majority opinion in Heien is silent on this point, and finding Justice Kagan's view
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contrary to the Supreme Court's admonition that Fourth Amendment rights
do not "vary from place to place and from time to time" and therefore do
not

"turn

upon . .. trivialities"

such

as

local

"police

enforcement

practices."2 95 It is certainly possible that the Eighth Circuit and the state
courts that previously were generous in characterizing mistakes as
reasonable will take the concurrence's warnings seriously. But if the past is
prologue, these courts may well stay the course and Heien may open the
door to stops based on misreadings of relatively clear statutory language.
After all, the concurring opinion in Heien represented the views of only
two Justices, and the majority was conspicuously silent concerning what
types of mistakes, other than "sloppy" ones, it considered unreasonable.2 96
Moreover, as Justice Sotomayor pointed out in dissent, quoting Justice
Story, "[tlhere is scarcely any law which does not admit of some ingenious
doubt." 2 97 The more leeway judges give law enforcement officials who
misinterpret state law, and the more frequently they follow the more
tolerant lower court opinions described above, the closer the Fourth
Amendment inquiry will begin to resemble the analysis applied in qualified
immunity cases. Despite the Heien Court's assurances that its reasonable
mistake standard is "more demanding" 298 and "not as forgiving" 299 as
qualified immunity, excusing police officers' misinterpretations of state
law in cases of first impression, where the courts below were divided, or
because of the officers' training, experience, beliefs, or past practices will
narrow the gap between Heien and qualified immunity. In that event, Heien
can be expected to follow the path cleared by the Court's qualified
immunity jurisprudence, shielding the police unless they were "plainly
incompetent" or "knowingly" misread the law, 30 0 or "existing
precedent . . placed the . . question beyond debate" such that "every
reasonable" law enforcement official would have known the officer in
question was mistaken about the criminal statute.301

"questionable" given that "[o]bjective inquiries often incorporate relevant facts ...
advice").

295.
296.

like training and

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996).
Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 539. See Kerr, supra note 244 (observing that "[s]loppiness is a relative

term," and the Court did not clarify whether an officer is expected to know "the text of the law," "the
major cases interpreting the law," or "just . .. what is taught at the police academy").

297. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 544 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Barlow v. United States, 32
U.S. (7 Pet.) 404, 411 (1833)).
298. Id. at 541 (Kagan, J., concurring).
299. Id. at 539 (majority opinion).
300. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). For discussion of the Supreme Court's
tendency in recent opinions to covertly broaden the qualified immunity defense, see, e.g., Kinports,
supra note 238.

301.

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). Compare Transcript of Oral Argument,

supra note 35, at 31 (attorney for the State offering as examples of unreasonable police mistakes of law

situations where the statute contained "plain language" such that "no one could reach a different
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C. Reaching Even Further

The likelihood that the lower courts will continue to extend Heien
beyond traffic stops and into the realm of arrests and searches requiring
probable cause, and the prospect that they will endorse generous definitions
of a reasonable mistake of law, are just two factors that will determine the
ultimate impact of the Court's decision. Perhaps even more troubling is the
possibility that Heien's mistake of law rule may be combined with other
recent Supreme Court decisions that have read the Fourth Amendment
narrowly, thereby sanctioning even unreasonable police errors.
First, consider Devenpeck v. Alford, which, as described above, allows
an arrest so long as "the facts known to the arresting officer[]" created
probable cause to believe the defendant committed some crime, even one
completely unrelated to the charge that actually motivated the arrest. 30 2
According to the Court, Devenpeck followed from the principle that "the
Fourth Amendment's concern with 'reasonableness"' permits certain law
enforcement actions "whatever the subjective intent" of the individual
police officers involved.303 On the facts before it, the Court found state
appellate court case law that "clearly established" Alford was not guilty of
the Privacy Act charge for which he was arrested. 304 Nevertheless, under
the Court's reasoning, Alford's arrest was permissible if there was probable
cause to believe he committed some other offense, such as impersonating a
police officer.30 5
Presumably, Sergeant Devenpeck's interpretation of the Privacy Act
contrary to settled precedent would be deemed unreasonable today under
Heien. Suppose as well that Alford did not commit the crime of
impersonating a police officer simply by activating the flashing "wig-wag"
headlights on his car.306 Could his arrest nonetheless be justified if the
meaning of the impersonation statute was less certain such that some other
police officer might have wrongly, but reasonably, believed it banned
civilians' use of wig-wag lights? After all, like Devenpeck, the inquiry
interpretation" and where "there was a definite decision by an appellate court"), with United States v.
Longoria, No. 4:16CR16-MW, 2016 WL 1642654, atA11 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 23, 2016) (relying on Heien
in finding that officer "was acting in good faith, was not 'plainly incompetent' by any stretch of the
imagination, and yet also made an 'unreasonable' mistake [of fact] within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment").

302.
303.

543 U.S. 146, 155 (2004); see supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814 (1996) (emphasis omitted); see Devenpeck, 543

U.S. at 153. But cf Kit Kinports, Criminal Procedure in Perspective, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY

71, 77-95 (2007) (discussing the fluctuations between objective and subjective standards characterizing
the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).

304. Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 151.
305. See id. at 155-56.
306. See id. at 148 (defining these headlights as ones which "flash the left and right lights
alternately").
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mandated by Heien is meant to be a purely objective one that "do[es] not
examine the subjective understanding of the particular officer involved."30 7
At least one district court has already linked Devenpeck and Heien in
granting qualified immunity. 308 In that case, the judge rejected law
enforcement officials' claim that they made a reasonable mistake of law in
believing they had probable cause to seize synthetic marijuana based on a
statute prohibiting "hallucinogenic substances" that did not actually exist
and a provision criminalizing "controlled substance analogs" that had not
yet gone into effect.309 Nevertheless, the court concluded that their mistake
of law was reasonable because the officers could reasonably have thought
the ban on "harmful intoxicants" covered synthetic marijuana, even though
the officers did not testify they based the seizure on that statute. 3 10 If this
reasoning is extended beyond the confines of qualified immunity, the
cumulative effect of Devenpeck and Heien would allow stops even in cases
where a police officer's interpretation of a state criminal statute was
unreasonable.
Second, consider Herringv. United States, which involved a wrongful
arrest stemming from an out-of-date computer database. 3 1 1 Unlike Arizona
v. Evans, the similar good-faith exception case, the error in Herring was
attributable to a neighboring sheriffs office and not a court employee.3 12
Although the Court observed that the officer who actually arrested Herring
"did nothing improper," it appropriately did not rely on the Leon good-faith
exception because the failure to update the computer records was the result
of law enforcement negligence and thus could not be blamed on an
independent third party.3 13
Nevertheless, the Chief Justice's opinion for the majority refused to
exclude the evidence uncovered following Herring's arrest, pronouncing
broadly that the case involved "isolated negligence attenuated from the
arrest" and that the exclusionary rule does not apply to "[a]n error that

307. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 539 (2014).
308. See J Mack L.L.C. v. Leonard, No. 2:13-cv-808, 2015 WL 519412, at *9-11 (S.D. Ohio
Feb. 9, 2015); see also Dunlap v. Anchorage Police Dep't, No. 3:1 0-cv-00242-SLG, 2016 WL 900625,
at *6 (D. Alaska Mar. 8, 2016) (recognizing the potential link, but characterizing the issue as
"unsettled").
309. See JMackL.L.C., 2015 WL 519412, at *9-10.
310. See id. at *9-11.
311. 555 U.S. 135, 137-38 (2009).
312. See id; Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1995).
313.
Herring, 555 U.S. at 140 (admitting that "[iun analyzing the applicability of the
[exclusionary] rule, Leon admonished that we must. consider the actions of all the police officers

involved"). This acknowledgment has not, however, stopped either the Court itself or others from
mistakenly aligning Herringwith the good-faith exception line of cases. See Davis v. United States, 564
U.S. 229, 239 (2011) (implying that Herringis the "[m]ost recent[]" application of Leon); Orin S. Kerr,
Good Faith, New Law, and the Scope of the ExclusionaryRule, 99 GEO. L.J. 1077, 1105 (2011).
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arises from nonrecurring and attenuated negligence." 314 "To trigger the
exclusionary rule," Herringexplained, "police conduct must be sufficiently
deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently
culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice
system." 315 The Court then concluded that the exclusionary rule operates as
a deterrent sufficient to justify the costs of suppression in cases involving
"deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some
circumstances recurring or systemic negligence." 3 16
Can Herringbe combined with Heien to uphold the constitutionality of
searches and seizures based on unreasonable mistakes of law, so long as the
officer's error can be characterized as an "isolated" and "nonrecurring"
one? To be sure, Herring differs from Heien in several respects. First,
Herring involved a mistake of fact rather than a mistake of law, and
therefore might be distinguishable on that ground.3 17 But Heien has now
equated the two types of mistakes, and the cumulative impact of Heien and
Herring might therefore justify allowing the prosecution to introduce
evidence discovered after an officer made a negligent mistake of law.
Second, it is more difficult to characterize the officer's legal error in a case
like Heien as "attenuated," but Herring did not define that term and the
Court's later descriptions of Herring have noticeably omitted any mention
of that limitation.
Third, and most important, Herring involved a remedial issuewhether the exclusionary rule was available to the defendant in that caseand therefore, according to the Court's dichotomy between substantive
Fourth Amendment rights and remedies, ought to be irrelevant to Heien.3 19
Nevertheless, during the oral argument in Heien, the Chief Justice
mentioned Herringwhen suggesting that the argument for considering "the
314.
315.
316.

Herring,555 U.S. at 137, 144.
Id. at 144.
Id The Court's decision in Herring has justifiably inspired blistering critiques. See, e.g.,

Albert W. Alschuler, Herring v. United States: A Minnow or a Shark?, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 463
(2009); David H. Kaye, Unraveling the Exclusionary Rule: From Leon to Herring to Robinson-and
Back?, 58 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 207 (2011); Kinports, supra note 93, at 840-55; Wayne R.
LaFave, The Smell of Herring: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Latest Assault on the Exclusionary
Rule, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 757 (2009).

317. See United States v. Song Ja Cha, 597 F.3d 995, 1005-06 & n.8 (9th Cir. 2010) (suggesting
that Herringcan be distinguished for that reason).
318. See Davis, 564 U.S. at 236-41; see also Kaye, supra note 316, at 211 (criticizing the
extension of Herring to non-attenuated circumstances); LaFave, supra note 316, at 771 (speculating that
the reference to attenuation was added only to hold onto the majority in Herring);Note, supranote 117,
at 779 & nn.67-68 (citing lower court decisions disagreeing on the meaning of the term attenuation and
the extent to which it restricts the reach of Herring).
319.
See Herring, 555 U.S. at 137 (pointing out that the parties agreed Herring's arrest was
unconstitutional but disagreed whether he could use the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence
uncovered following the arrest). For discussion of the rights-remedies distinction, see supra notes 121-

22 and accompanying text.
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reasonableness of the officer's actions" in evaluating a mistake of law is
even "stronger" when analyzing the substantive Fourth Amendment
question than when considering the appropriate remedy "because that's
what the Fourth Amendment says." 3 20 The Chief Justice then went on to
opine, "I thought we said exactly that in Herring,...where we said that
even though we're going to look at it in terms of remedy, that was not to
say that the reasonableness didn't go to whether there was a substantive
violation of the Fourth Amendment." 321 The Chief Justice was referring to
his own dictum in Herring-the caveat that "a probable-cause
determination . . based on reasonable but mistaken assumptions" may not
"necessarily" amount to a Fourth Amendment violation3 22 -which, not
surprisingly, found its way into his opinion in Heien, although the
quotation was hidden in a parenthetical to a "cf." citation. 323
Even if Herring does not directly support extending Heien to uphold
the constitutionality of seizures based on unreasonable police mistakes of
law, Heien could be cited by way of analogy to support extending Herring
to foreclose an exclusionary remedy in cases involving negligent mistakes
of law and thereby effectively achieve the same result through the remedial
back door. 32 4 At least one court has made this link, though ultimately
granting the defendant's motion to suppress after finding that the officers'
lack of familiarity with "long-standing California law permitting
pedestrians to walk in the middle of the road in a residential district"
amounted to "more than simple negligence."3 25 But that court apparently
saw no reason not to extend Herring'sremedial analysis to a mistake of
law, and a less egregious misreading of a state statute might persuade

320.

Transcript of Oral Argument, supranote 35, at 8.

321.
322.
323.

Id. at 8-9.
Herring, 555 U.S. at 139.
See Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 539 (2014). For further discussion of the

Herring dictum and Heien's citation to it, see supranotes 50-53 and accompanying text.
324. See Logan, supra note 82, at 86 (observing that Herring's "rationale aligns with judicial
inclination to forgive police mistakes of law"); Justin F. Marceau, The Fourth Amendment at a Three-

Way Stop, 62 ALA. L. REv. 687, 749 (2011) (noting that if Herring is "taken seriously," the
exclusionary rule will be unavailable when police make a legal error "in cases of unsettled law"); Orin
Kerr, Can a Police Officer Lawfully Pull Over a Car for a Traffic Violation Based on an Erroneous
Understanding of the Traffic Laws?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 21, 2012, 3:42 PM),

http://volokh.com/2012/12/21/can-a-police-officer-lawfully-pull-over-a-car-for-a-traffic-violation(describing Heien as raising "basically a
based-on-an-erroneous-understanding-of-the-traffic-laws/
remedies question under the guise of substantive Fourth Amendment law"); cf Brief for the

Respondent, supra note 35, at 37-39 (arguing that Herring called for denying an exclusionary remedy
in Heien, though calling the mistake of law there reasonable).
325. People v. Jones, No. B255728, 2015 WL 1873269, at *7-8 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2015)
(pointing out that the law had been settled for more than fifty years); see also United States v.

Nicholson, 721 F.3d 1236, 1257 (10th Cir. 2013) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (urging the district court on
remand to consider Herring's "new culpability framework" in determining whether to apply the

exclusionary rule in a pre-Heien case involving a police mistake of law).
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another court to deny a motion to suppress on the grounds that the officer's
error was merely negligent.
Finally, assuming Herring (backed by Heien's support) justifies the
refusal to exclude evidence in cases where an unreasonable mistake of law
was based on the police officer's own misinterpretation of the applicable
state statutes, rather than on some authoritative third party, is the next step
to uphold the constitutionality of a search---or deny an exclusionary
remedy-when that officer mistakenly believed, for example, that the
Fourth Amendment authorized a warrantless search? 326 Admittedly, the
Court in Heien was careful to limit the reach of its ruling to mistakes of law
involving the criminal statute an officer thought the suspect was violating.
In fact, all nine Justices seemingly agreed that a mistake on Sergeant
Darisse's part concerning Fourth Amendment doctrine would have been
irrelevant in that case "no matter how reasonable." 327And none of the
Court's other precedents-neither Herring nor the good-faith exception
line of cases--excuse a police officer who acted in violation of the
Constitution based on her own mistaken interpretation of Fourth
Amendment doctrine.328

326. Qualified immunity, of course, routinely shields police officers who are mistaken about the
contours of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 243-45 (2009)
(concluding that police reasonably believed that the "consent-once-removed" doctrine authorized their
warrantless entry into a suspect's home); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) (noting that
law enforcement officials are entitled to qualified immunity if they "reasonably but mistakenly
conclude[d]" that a warrantless search was justified by probable cause and exigent circumstances, so
long as "a reasonable officer could have believed [the] warrantless search to be lawful"). Interestingly,
despite language in some Supreme Court opinions, see Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 ("The protection of
qualified immunity applies regardless of whether the government official's error is 'a mistake of law, a
mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact."' (quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540
U.S. 551, 567 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting))), it is less clear that qualified immunity is available in
cases involving mistakes of fact. See Karen Blum, Erwin Chemerinsky & Martin A. Schwartz,
Qualified Immunity Developments. Not Much Hope Left for Plaintiffs, 29 TouRo L. REv. 633, 657
n.175 (2013).
327. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 539 ("An officer's mistaken view that the conduct at issue did not give
rise to [a Fourth Amendment] violation-no matter how reasonable-could not change that ultimate
conclusion."); see id. at 541 n. 1 (Kagan, J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority that a constitutional
search or seizure may "never" be based on "an error about the contours of the Fourth Amendment
itself'); id. at 546 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (likewise citing the Court's "prior assumption" that police
have no "leeway" when making mistakes about the Fourth Amendment); see also Brief for the
Respondent, supra note 35, at 29-30, 31 & n.2 (making this concession as well); Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 64, at 30 n.3 (same); cf United States v.
Keefauver, 74 M.J. 230, 235-36 (C.A.A.F. 2015) (interpreting Heien as refusing to tolerate any
mistakes about the Fourth Amendment); Perez v. State, No. 08-13-00024-CR, 2016 WL 323761, at *11
(Tex. App. Jan. 27, 2016) (likewise limiting Heien to "a mistake of substantive criminal law (what is a
crime) and not a mistake of criminal procedure (i.e. how far may a search extend)"). But cf Re, supra
note 249 (arguing that the Heien majority was "distinguishing cases, not expressly establishing a brightline rule for the future," and therefore might excuse an officer's "novel" mistakes about Fourth
Amendment norms).
328. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 599 (2006), is the exception, but it is limited to denying
an exclusionary remedy for violations of the knock-and-announce rule.
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But if Heien is based on the premise that the Fourth Amendment
requires only reasonableness on the part of law enforcement-after all, the
"touchstone" of the Amendment is reasonableness 329-why draw the line at
mistakes about the dictates of the Fourth Amendment? 330 Likewise, if the
Leon good-faith exception cases justify limiting the reach of the
exclusionary rule on the theory that the suppression remedy cannot hope to
influence objectively reasonable police behavior, 33 1 should an officer's
reasonable mistake about Fourth Amendment requirements fare less
well? 3 3 2 Adding Herring to the mix, if the Court correctly reasoned there
that the exclusionary remedy ought to be restricted to sufficiently culpable
police behavior, should even an officer's unreasonable reading of Fourth
Amendment doctrine be excused so long as it involved mere isolated and
nonrecurring negligence? 333
Dictum can already be found in the Court's opinion in Davis v. United
States, the most recent in the Leon line of cases, that arguably supports
denying the exclusionary remedy when police are mistaken about Fourth
Amendment doctrine.3 34 In describing its prior case law, the Davis majority
observed broadly that the exclusionary rule is unavailable "when the police
act with an objectively 'reasonable good-faith belief' that their conduct is
lawful." 335 Channeling Herring, Davis then went further: "When the police
exhibit 'deliberate,' 'reckless,' or 'grossly negligent' disregard for Fourth
Amendment rights, the deterrent value of exclusion is strong and tends to
outweigh the resulting costs." 3 36 This last comment was completely

unnecessary, of course, because Davis was a straightforward good-faith
exception case where the police reasonably relied on precedent and

329.

See supra note 29 and accompanying text.

330. Cf Kerr, supra note 136 (commenting that "it's not clear to me why [it] should make a
difference" whether an officer's reasonable mistake concerned "the substantive [criminal] law" as in
Heien or "the operative Fourth Amendment rule").
331. See supranote 118 and accompanying text.
332. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 246 (1983) (White, J., concurring in the judgment)
(endorsing this position); Note, supra note 117, at 783-84 (same).
333. See Marceau, supra note 324, at 752-53 (observing that, if given a "broad reading,"
Herring could be extended to police errors in assessing whether probable cause exists for a warrantless
search, though calling these mistakes of fact); see also United States v. LeClerc, No. 14-CR-217-A,
2016 WL 2763787, at *7-9 (W.D.N.Y. May.13, 2016) (assuming without discussion that Herring
applied to a Fourth Amendment error, but ultimately suppressing the evidence because the police were
at least grossly negligent in believing the defendant's wife had apparent authority to consent to search);
White v. Commonwealth, 785 S.E.2d 239, 254-55 (Va. Ct. App. 2016) (citing both Heien and Herring,
but applying exclusionary rule where police knew defendant owned the bag that was searched and,
given five-year-old state supreme court precedent, could not reasonably have believed his girlfriend had
authority to consent to search).

334.

564 U.S. 229, 232 (2011) (extending the good-faith exception to cases where police

reasonably relied on precedent).

335.
336.

Id. at 238 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984)).
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009)).

174

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 68:1:121

therefore were not even negligent. Moreover, it is not clear what Davis's
vague references to "lawful" police behavior and "Fourth Amendment
rights" were meant to encompass, but a prosecution-friendly court might
well read that language to support the refusal to apply the exclusionary
remedy where a law enforcement official made a reasonable (or even
negligent) mistake about the Fourth Amendment rules governing searches
and seizures. 33 7 Given the caveats in the various opinions in Heien
concerning police errors in interpreting the Fourth Amendment, denying
that a police officer's misreading of the Fourth Amendment led to a
violation of the defendant's constitutional rights would be more difficult. 3 3 8
But here again those mistakes could prove inconsequential if the combined
impact of Heien and Herring (as characterized in Davis) forecloses the
defendant from using the exclusionary rule to suppress the evidence
resulting from the Fourth Amendment violation.
In its own right, the Court's ruling in Heien potentially has an
expansive reach. The extension of the Court's decision to probable cause
determinations is likely to continue undisturbed, and some courts have
already been fairly generous in characterizing law enforcement officials'
legal errors as reasonable. But the cumulative impact of Heien and other
recent Supreme Court decisions-notably Devenpeck, Herring, and
Davis-may encourage judges to refuse to recognize a constitutional
violation or to suppress evidence in cases involving even unreasonable
police mistakes of law, possibly including mistakes about Fourth
Amendment doctrine.

337. At least one pre-Heien opinion already has endorsed a "general good faith" exception. See
United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 173, 177 n.9 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc) (concluding that the
"general good faith test" applies whenever police had an "'objectively reasonable' and "good faith
belief in the lawfulness of their conduct," and observing that the Supreme Court has never required

reliance on "some 'unequivocally binding' authority" as "a condition precedent to applying the good
faith exception" (quoting Davis, 564 U.S. at 239; United States v. Katzin, No. 11-226, 2012 WL
1645458, at *9 (E.D. Pa. May 9, 2012))). But cf United States v. Mota, 155 F. Supp. 3d 461, 475
(S.D.N.Y. 2016) (refusing to deny exclusionary remedy in case involving an unreasonable mistake of
law on the grounds that "[t]he common thread uniting the[] exceptions [recognized in Herring and the

Leon line of cases] is that it was not the officer conducting the search who erred, but another actor").
338. See supra note 327 and accompanying text; see also Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31,
39 (1979) (despite upholding the constitutionality of an arrest for violating an unconstitutionally vague
ordinance, the Court distinguished prior precedents that found a Fourth Amendment violation where
searches were based on statutes that "did not satisfy the traditional warrant and probable-cause
requirements," reasoning that the vague ordinance there "did not directly authorize the arrest or search"

and thus "bore a different relationship to the challenged searches"); cf Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340,
355 n.12 (1987) (recognizing a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule where police reasonably
relied on an unconstitutional statute, but not challenging the distinction drawn in DeFillippo as a matter
of substantive Fourth Amendment law).
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III. CONCLUSION

Heien's ruling that the Fourth Amendment forgives reasonable police
mistakes of law sparked little controversy either in the Court itself or in the
media, perhaps because the opinion was so cursory and its overly simplistic
analysis merely equated mistakes of fact and law. Citing Fourth
Amendment precedent that focused exclusively on factual errors made by
law enforcement officials, the Heien majority ignored the reasons it has
instructed courts to defer to police officers, which carry much less weight
when applied to their interpretations of the law.
In addition, the Court too quickly discounted the relevance of the
maxim that ignorance of the law is no defense. The rationales underlying
the traditional presumption that everyone knows the law, even if flawed,'
are at least as persuasive for law enforcement officials as for the general
populace. Consistent with the maxim and its exceptions, the only police
mistakes of law that ought to be excused are those based on an official
interpretation of the law provided by an authoritative and independent third
party. That approach mirrors not only criminal law and its venerable
maxim, but also the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
Under this view, officers who themselves made a pure mistake of law,
erroneously believing that state statutes barred certain conduct, would not
have the reasonable suspicion required to conduct a stop. Even though a
reasonable mistake of fact would not undermine the validity of a stop, the
Fourth Amendment would not permit even a reasonable mistake of law.
This is not to say, however, that a police officer's error in applying the
law to a particular case could not justify a stop. Suppose, for example, that
a state's vehicle laws prohibited "excessive" tinting of windows, or
traveling at an "unsafe" rate of speed given the conditions, without
providing any objective content to the terms "excessive" or "unsafe." A
court that disagreed with a law enforcement official's conclusion that a
car's window tinting was excessive or its rate of speed unsafe would not
necessarily invalidate the traffic stop if the officer's mistake in applying the
law to the facts of the case was a reasonable one. Although some scholars
view these mixed questions of law and fact as essentially legal issues, 3 39 the
hypothetical officer here might be perfectly familiar with the language of
the relevant statute, and her assessment that it was violated involves a
judgment similar to the factual determinations that traditionally merit
judicial deference.340

339. See supra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
340. See Robinson v. State, 377 S.W.3d 712, 719 n.22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (providing
illustrations of similar application questions).
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In allowing a broader range of police errors, Heien's brief and
deceptively simple reasoning should not lull Court watchers into
minimizing the significance of the decision. Even before Heien, law
enforcement officials already had powerful tools in their arsenal, and they
used those tools to stop about one in ten drivers. 34 1 They could choose from
a multitude of minor traffic violations to conduct what were admittedly
purely pretextual traffic stops.342 As Orin Kerr colorfully put it, "As a
practical matter, if an officer [couldn't] find a traffic violation to stop a car,
he [wasn't] trying very hard." 34 3 Even if the officer made the wrong choice,
the stop was nevertheless valid so long as there was reasonable suspicion to
believe the suspect had committed some other, even completely unrelated,
offense.
Others have written forcefully about the disparate impact these various
law enforcement practices have had on racial and ethnic minorities, and the
growing tensions between the police and communities of color are all too
familiar. 34 5 Kevin Johnson, for example, has charged that the Supreme
Court's validation of pretext stops is "in no small part responsible for the
fact that race dominates much of modem U.S. law enforcement." 346 In his
prize-winning book, Ta-Nehisi Coates wrote to his son, "[T]he police
departments of your country have been endowed with the authority to
341. See LANGTON & DUROSE, supra note 17, at 3 (reporting that approximately ten percent of
the 212.3 million drivers in this country were stopped in 2011).
342. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). For illustrative cases, see supra note
106. For others criticizing Heien on this ground, see Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 543
(2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); LAFAVE, supra note 85, § 3.2(b), at 9-10; Logan, supra note 6, at
90-91.
343.

Kerr, supra note 324; see also PAUL BUTLER, LET'S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF

JUSTICE 24-25 (2009) (reporting that police were able to cite a traffic violation after following any
vehicle for just three or four blocks); cf Logan, supra note 6, at 89-90 (arguing that Heien gives
legislatures "even less reason to avoid textual imprecision"); Kerr, supra note 324 (pointing out that
legislatures are "likely to fix" any deficiency in the traffic laws "in the government's favor pronto").
344. See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 155 (2004). For further discussion of Devenpeck,
see supranotes 40-44, 302-310 and accompanying text.
345. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, (E)racingthe Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REv. 946,
952, 966 (2002) (explaining that "[t]he very sight of the police in my rear view mirror is
unnerving ... [and] engenders feelings of vulnerability," and that experience with the police "affects
the everyday lives of people of color," leading to, among other things, "internalized racial obedience
toward, and fear of, the police"); David A. Harris, Factorsfor Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and
Poor Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 660, 681 (1994) (observing that the
disproportionate number of stops directed at the poor and racial minorities "perpetuates a cycle of
mistrust and suspicion," thereby "widening the racial divide in the United States"). See generally supra
note 17 and accompanying text.

346. Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of the Land: United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98
GEO. L.J. 1005, 1075 (2010); cf Gabriel J. Chin & Charles J. Vernon, Reasonable but Unconstitutional:
Racial Profiling and the Radical Objectivity of Whren v. United States, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 882,
887-88 (2015) (arguing that while the decision to permit pretext stops was "not only defensible, but
perhaps inevitable," the justification for "immunization of racial discrimination has collapsed" and a
search or seizure motivated by race is "unreasonable" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
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destroy your body... . And destruction is merely the superlative form of a
dominion whose prerogatives include friskings, detainings, beatings, and
humiliations. All of this is common to black people."347
Heien exacerbates these intractable problems by permitting stops of
even completely law-abiding citizens so long as the police were "close
enough" in thinking they were violating some traffic regulation.348 By
tolerating reasonable mistakes of law and creating room for the reach of the
opinion to expand-to the more intrusive searches and seizures requiring
probable cause, to generous notions of what mistakes of law are considered
reasonable, and potentially, in combination with other recent decisions, to
the refusal to sanction even unreasonable mistakes of law-Heien can
without hyperbole be viewed as another step in the Supreme Court's
"stealth" campaign to narrow the protections afforded by the Fourth
Amendment. 34 9

347.

TA-NEHISI COATES, BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME 9 (2015).

348. Scott H. Greenfield, Heien v. North Carolina: Close Enough, SIMPLE JUSTICE (Dec. 16,
2014), http://blog.simplejustice.us/2014/12/16/heien-v-north-carolina-close-enough/.
349.

Cf Barry Friedman, The Wages ofStealth Overruling(with ParticularAttention to Miranda

v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 5 (2010) (arguing that the Supreme Court has engaged in the "stealth
overruling" of Miranda-by "disingenuous[ly] treat[ing] precedents in a manner that obscures
fundamental change in the law" and thereby "avoid[s] public attention to the Court's diminishing of its
own precedents").

